How the Trump Administration Can Improve America's Critical Mineral Strategy

Farrell Gregory | Policy Fellow, Foundation for American Innovation | RA, Yorktown Institute

As he prepares to take office in January 2025, President-elect Trump faces a wide array of pressing security concerns: war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and historically tense relations with China. For each of these universally acknowledged issues, he could take a sharply different approach than outgoing President Biden. But when it comes to the less-discussed threat of vulnerable critical mineral supply chains, President-elect Trump should simultaneously build on the achievements of his first term and improve the Biden administration’s mineral security strategy.

Between 2016 and 2020, the first Trump administration issued several executive orders to reshape critical mineral policy amid increasingly strained ties with China. Recognising the vulnerabilities that come from relying on competitors for essential military and commercial manufacturing inputs, President-elect Trump issued Executive Order 13817 to provide an outline for mineral and supply chain strategy that executive agencies would fill in. Towards the end of 2020, he used Executive Order 13953 to declare the critical mineral crisis a national emergency and further directed executive agencies to take action. 

Upon taking office, President Biden utilised a wide range of tools to address the mineral crisis. Executive Order 14017 initiated a 100-day review of critical mineral supply chains. Portions of the Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act subsidise mineral production costs and fund certain mining projects. He was similarly active abroad: launching the fourteen-country Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) in June 2022 and conducting two different executive agreements with the EU and Japan in 2023.

But the US’ critical mineral supply chains remain vulnerable to disruption and threats from abroad. American industry is heavily reliant on China for minerals with essential commercial and military applications. China refines more than 65% of the world’s lithium and cobalt, as well as 91% of graphite – minerals necessary for batteries, munitions, and drones. And China has proven itself more than willing to restrict the flow of certain critical minerals; in August, it introduced export controls for antimony, a critical mineral with a number of military applications. The incoming administration has the unique opportunity to build on President Trump’s existing critical mineral legacy and address the shortcomings of the current administration’s approach. By further enabling domestic mining, utilising price support and tariffs, and expanding tax incentives, the Trump administration has the potential to reduce America’s critical mineral vulnerability.

The final mineral action of Trump’s previous term could be his first this time around: declaring the critical mineral crisis to be a national emergency. President Biden allowed Executive Order 13943’s declaration to expire, but on day one, Trump should bring it back. The previous declaration relied on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, which provides the president with broad authority over economic matters in times of crisis, including the levelling of sanctions, imposition of tariffs, and export controls. By once again declaring the obvious—that the critical mineral crisis is a national emergency—the second Trump administration widens the range of tools it can use to fortify our supply chains.

Second, President-elect Trump can capitalise on America’s abundant natural resources to alleviate our vulnerability to supply chain disruptions abroad. The difficulty of the critical mineral crisis is that while some minerals are scarce because the country doesn’t have any domestic deposits, others are scarce because it chooses not to use its own natural resources. In 2018, the Trump administration began permitting mining again in the Superior National Forest in Minnesota, the site of Antofagasta PLC’s potential mine for nickel and copper—both critical minerals. In 2023, the Biden administration put in place a 20-year moratorium on mining across more than 200,000 acres in the area, imperilling the development of Antofagasta PLC’s mine. While placing a priority on environmental protection, the Trump administration could still enable mining operations by rescinding the moratorium and opening up some of the Bureau of Land Management’s 245 million acres of public land for critical mineral mining.

Finally, the Trump administration has a wide range of tools at its disposal to address mineral prices—some of which the Biden administration has used. In addition to a slew of tariffs that President Biden introduced on imports of Chinese semiconductors, batteries, and electric vehicles, he also imposed 25% tariffs on certain Chinese-exported critical minerals such as natural graphite, to take effect in 2026. In the meantime, President-elect Trump has many options for addressing price issues that destabilise America’s domestic mineral market. Tariffs, which he has enthusiastically promoted throughout the election, could make the price of American-produced minerals more competitive. But Trump may also consider reviving a price-floor plan that the Department of Energy was rumoured to be considering earlier this year. Supply shocks from abroad that drive mineral prices dramatically up and down destabilise America’s efforts to build up greater mining capabilities. In 2023, the price of lithium, a critical mineral, crashed by 75% compared to the year before. As a result, the mining firm Albemarle postponed opening a lithium hydroxide processing plant in South Carolina. Without stability for mineral markets, efforts to grow America’s domestic mining and processing capacity will face strong headwinds.

The critical mineral crisis is increasingly regarded as an issue by a bipartisan range of lawmakers and policymakers—this is in no small part thanks to the executive orders that Trump issued during his first term to outline and begin implementing a national mineral strategy. Similarly, President Biden worked closely with allies abroad to lay the foundation for more resilient mineral supply chains. Now, empowered by his electoral success and majorities in Congress, President-elect Trump has an opportunity to build on the legacy of his first term and remedy the shortcomings of America’s current critical mineral strategy.

Japan’s “Asia NATO”: A Blueprint for Indo-Pacific Security?

Mitchell Gallagher

Amid the sprawling and cutthroat landscape of Asian strategic competition, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s bold proposal for an "Asia NATO" breaks sharply from Japan’s postwar tradition of pacifism. This concept recalls, perhaps romantically, the creation of NATO in 1949—a security alliance born under the deft hands of Dean Acheson to contain Soviet expansion. Yet an Asian NATO faces a far different set of players and trepidations. His prospective coalition would encounter not a singular threat but a sprawling security puzzle, from China’s advancing military power to the nuclear ambitions harboured by North Korea. The obstacles are daunting, the concept bold, and the potential impact on the region truly transformative.

The Transformation of Japanese Security Thinking

The journey from the constraints of Article 9 in Japan’s constitution to Ishiba’s dream of a collective Asian defence tells a story of resilience, adaptation, and reawakening. After WWII, Japan’s constitution was drafted to renounce war, forbidding the country from maintaining anything but minimal defence forces. Any notion that Japan might one day lead a military alliance in Asia would have seemed surreal in 1947. Yet today, the very idea emerges from the highest echelons of Japanese leadership, signalling how far the country’s strategic culture has travelled.

The genesis of this aspiration is embedded in a well-established, continuously shifting doctrine. For decades, the Yoshida Doctrine governed Japanese defence policy, favouring economic development over military might and outsourcing security to the United States. This doctrine served Japan well during the Cold War but has since grown stale. The ghosts of Yoshida still linger in policy debates, but each North Korean missile test and Chinese patrol near the Senkaku Islands strengthens the argument for a more muscular defence posture. A Japanese plan for Asia NATO represents a conclusive evolution, moving Tokyo from a position of dependency to one of active leadership in the region’s security architecture.

Blueprint of a New Order

Ishiba’s Asia NATO plan is as daring as it is pragmatic. At its heart, he conceives an alliance modelled on NATO’s Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a formidable deterrent in any language. Any future alliance would pull together a veritable “who’s who” of Indo-Pacific powers, including  Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India. Shattering conventional models, this offer brings ASEAN states on board with flexible, strategic partnerships—a network built to match the volatile pulse of Asia’s political arena. 

However, any such alliance must reckon with the tacit yet ineluctable prominence of Taiwan. The annals of history position Taiwan as the litmus test for Sino-American tenacity, its geopolitical gravity evident in the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s and China’s 1996 missile gambit, both countered by commanding U.S. naval force. Despite its omission from official dialogues, Taiwan’s geopolitical relevance guarantees its informal role in any Indo-Pacific strategy as essential rather than expendable.

Yet, for all its simplicity on paper, what seems simple at a glance is actually a coiled network of questionable alliances and treacherous complexities. How, for instance, will such an alliance tackle command and control? NATO’s integrated military command took decades to refine; any Asian equivalent would need to harmonise India’s fierce commitment to strategic autonomy, Australia’s obligations under the ANZUS treaty, and Japan’s own constitutional limitations on the use of force. Ishiba’s Asia NATO recalls the efforts of SEATO in the 1950s—a fleeting attempt at collective defence in Asia that collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions. SEATO’s pitfalls are hard to ignore, but so is the scale of opportunity. If an Asian NATO gains any traction, it could anchor a new era of regional stability.

Strategic Imperatives and Regional Stakes

Beijing’s response to Asia NATO discussions came as no shock, delivering an immediate and resounding rejection of the idea. Guided by its age-old philosophy of "Tianxia"—a universal hierarchy—China perceives alliances as mechanisms of encirclement rather than legitimate means of ensuring security. Many in China wasted no time in branding the plan as outdated Cold War thinking and cautioning against zero-sum games, casting the alliance as a thinly masked strategy to hinder its rise.

What propels Ishiba’s invitation is the intense recalibration of power coursing through Asia. Through rapid military upgrades, China has converted speculative risks into concrete and immediate perils. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) now fields a fleet larger than that of the U.S. Navy, with air defence systems creating an imposing anti-access barrier across the Western Pacific. Furthermore, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program adds volatility to an already fragile status quo. This new reality insists on regional coordination, leaving behind the piecemeal, ad hoc alliances of the past.

The stakes in the South China Sea are enormous, with this vital waterway seeing more than $5.3 trillion in trade  move through its routes each year. China’s island-building and militarisation efforts threaten to transform this international thoroughfare into a zone of exclusive Chinese influence. Asia NATO would cement a barrier around navigational rights, echoing NATO’s fierce Cold War stance over the Atlantic’s vital trade arteries. The logic is unambiguous: only through collective action can Asia hope to counterbalance these aggressive maritime moves and preserve the rule of law at sea.

More than a countermeasure, an Asian NATO repositions Asia as the master of its own security game. For generations, Asian nations have leaned on outside powers for security. Ishiba’s idea—strategically audacious and psychologically liberating—calls on Asia to take control, instilling a long-awaited sense of agency and unity. The proposal attempts to manage the “security dilemma” outlined by Robert Jervis, where defensive measures can be misread as aggression. An Asia NATO, by virtue of its transparency and multilateral structure, could help to defuse this dilemma, allowing Asia to build a stable security system that avoids provoking Beijing unnecessarily while still protecting against its expansion.

The Question of American Power

Where does this leave the United States—Asia’s longstanding anchor—in the new security equation? Ishiba’s ambition disrupts the balance, pushing the very notion of hegemonic transition into uncharted territory. For centuries, theorists from Thucydides to Mearsheimer have pondered the consequences when rising powers challenge established orders.  In forging a third option, the strategy neither concedes to Chinese dominance nor demands U.S. oversight; instead, it envisions a robust, self-sufficient Asian alliance where American support is an asset rather than a crutch.

Historical comparisons abound. The UK’s slow strategic withdrawal from East Asia in the 1960s created a power vacuum that the United States’ “hub-and-spoke” alliance system gradually filled. This is not the old status quo; though the U.S. still holds a stake in Asian security, its focus drifts as competing crises clamour for priority. Ishiba’s plan serves as a buffer against a possible U.S. pullback, a safeguard for an uncertain future that keeps trans-Pacific connections firmly intact.

For Washington, the scheme could present a solution to the “free-rider” problem that has long plagued US-Asia security relations. An Asia NATO’s shared-responsibility model would lighten America’s load, fortifying regional defences without overtaxing US resources. From this angle, the arrangement may well be as beneficial for the US as it is for Asia.

The ASEAN Conundrum

A serious discussion of an Asia NATO has to reckon with ASEAN’s central place in the region. The organisation’s core tenets of non-interference and consensus rule sit uneasily beside the decisive commitments needed for a functional military alliance. However, the security calculus of individual ASEAN states has undergone a dramatic transformation in recent years. Vietnam’s defence partnerships with India, and the Philippines’ increasing reliance on US military support, suggest a quiet shift away from the ASEAN principle of non-alignment.

If Ishiba’s vision is to thrive, it will need to artfully handle ASEAN’s political terrain. Certain ASEAN countries may eagerly embrace security ties, whereas others might need a slower approach to adapt to a heightened military presence. To succeed, any Asia NATO must embrace adaptable participation, enabling diverse commitments that support inclusivity yet preserving its fundamental objectives.

Domestic Constraints and Constitutional Hurdles

Back home, Ishiba’s Asia NATO bid must contend not only with Japan’s legal and political obstacles, such as the famously pacifist Article 9, but also with Ishiba’s own political standing and that of the Liberal Democratic Party he leads . As Article 9 renounces war as a sovereign right, decades of reinterpretation have allowed Japan’s defence policy to evolve incrementally. However, an Asia NATO would likely push this interpretation to its limits, possibly requiring constitutional reforms to meet the demands of a multilateral security alliance.

The new Prime Minister is treading on shaky ground within The LDP, where he’s branded as a divisive figure. At odds with the party’s traditionalists and under relentless attack from a revitalised opposition, his path is laden with peril. His party, already reeling from a damaged reputation and significant losses in the 2024 Japanese elections, now faces the uphill battle of advancing bold defence initiatives in an increasingly polarised political environment.

Yet, the tide is turning, with increasing public sentiment in favour of a more robust defence policy, fuelled by the aggressive posturing of China and the ongoing missile provocations from North Korea. Naysayers might argue that an Asian NATO is a step too ambitious, but proponents believe it could ignite a necessary transformation, fuelling discussions on Japan’s security role regionally and potentially leading to a historic overhaul of the constitution—a change that, albeit divisive, could redefine Japan’s defence framework for the coming age.

Looking Ahead: Asia’s Future

Though the outcome of any Asian NATO is still unpredictable, it undeniably represents a significant inflexion point in the way continental security dynamics are viewed. Far from being a simple coalition of convenience, this represents a daring effort to shake up the region’s security landscape, harmonising independence with partnership, and fusing deterrence with diplomatic engagement. As Kenneth Waltz observed, international politics abhors a vacuum. In the Indo-Pacific, where power is as fluid as the waters of the South China Sea, new security frameworks are needed to manage rivalry and cooperation. An Asia NATO, whether it triumphs or stumbles, forges a bold framework for collective security that shatters the confines of bilateralism and propels the region toward a shared destiny.

In the end, the Asia NATO proposal ignites critical questions regarding Asia’s future order. Will regional powers transcend their historical grievances to construct a unified defence front? Will China’s surge drive regional powers into a desperate alliance, or can they seize the initiative to create one on their own terms? Where is Taiwan in this high-stakes game, and what messy challenges will arise as nations confront their historical grudges? And as these dynamics unfold, how will American influence adapt to this new reality? The answers to these questions will dictate the course of Indo-Pacific security for years to come; in themselves, those remain as unpredictable as the region itself.

Oxford Experts React to 2024 US Presidential Election

Mia Prange & Layla MoheyEldin | News Editors

Following the results of last week’s US presidential election, the international community is expecting the US to undergo major policy shifts over the next four years. STAIR asked experts from across Oxford to weigh in on how a second Trump presidency will impact various international issues, from climate change to the state of democracy worldwide. 

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“What does a second Trump presidency mean for the politicisation of global media?”

Dr. Andrew Dougall (Departmental Lecturer in International Relations)

Trump’s return to the White House inevitably raises questions about the politicisation of media in the United States, as well as its contribution to his re-election. When he last won in 2016, he was heralded as the ‘Twitter President’ and it became common sense to credit social media with electing him. In my view, this argument was overdrawn. First, it failed to account for how Trump capitalised on the radicalization of the right-wing mediasphere dating back to the Limbaugh-era of the early 2000s. Second, it ignored the role of centrist legacy outlets in re-mediating right-wing talking points. By 2020 and 2024, centrist outlets had largely become inured to Trump’s efforts to ‘pull’ coverage toward his perspective. The question, then, is what happened? 2024, I think, represents the breakdown of any pretence of a joined-up media sphere anchored around a common public square. Instead, it became a battle of two media spheres—the right vs the rest—to turn out voters and delegitimize one another. The roots of this schism long predate Trump. Yet his second victory cements him as his generation’s most skilled proponent of ‘divide and rule.’ It remains to be seen whether this signals a deeper—and potentially irredeemable—breakdown in voters’ capacity to entertain the possibility of truth transcending difference. And that is before we consider the potential contribution of generative AI, which—perhaps mercifully—appeared to play a minor role this time around.

"What does a second Trump presidency mean for immigration?”

Professor Carlos Vargas-Silva (Professor in Migration Studies and Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS))

Public opinion surveys in the United States suggest that the state of the economy is a major concern and a public policy priority. It follows that US voters should support policies that are beneficial for the country’s economy. Yet, even with the substantial evidence of the economic benefits of migration, a majority of American voters supported the restrictive agenda of Donald Trump, which puts emphasis on deportations and limits on the right to US citizenship, among others.

Aware of the complex links of migration to the economy, politicians often rally around restrictions on an unpopular type of immigration for electoral purposes (for example, irregular border crossings), but support other types after the election period. For instance, ending EU free movement, a key facilitator of migration to the UK, was the main promise of the political leaders campaigning for Brexit. Yet, some of those same leaders later established a relatively liberal post-Brexit immigration system that has led to record net-migration levels in the country, even without EU free movement.

Will the second Donald Trump administration follow the same pattern or will they fulfil their campaign promises on immigration? The one consistent feature of the first Trump administration was its unpredictability. Hence, we have to wait and see. The Biden and Obama administrations did have a restrictive agenda targeted at particular migrant groups, including deportations, but adopted a more conciliatory narrative regarding overall migration. The one thing we can be sure about the second Trump administration is that whatever policies are adopted on migration, in practice it will be accompanied by a very strong rhetoric.

"What does a second Trump presidency mean for Latin America?"

Dr. Felipe Krause (Departmental Lecturer in Latin American Studies, fmr. Diplomat, Brazilian Foreign Service)

I think a significant shift in US-Latin American relations is about to happen. The region can expect to move from a phase of relative neglect to one of more strategic, albeit self-serving, US engagement. Unlike what would have been seen under a Kamala Harris administration, which would have likely focused on human rights, governance and climate/environment talks, Trump’s approach will prioritise US economic and security interests. Mexico in particular, but also the broader region, will become central to three critical issues: immigration, drug control and countering China’s influence. Policies aimed at stemming migration and the flow of drugs, reducing inflation through low-cost manufacturing, and reducing reliance on Chinese trade via nearshoring will hinge on maintaining a sustainable but pressured relationship with Mexico.

In the context of regional politics, Trump’s return could resonate with leaders like Javier Milei in Argentina and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, lending them rhetorical support while concrete benefits remain uncertain. For Brazil, the scenario is nuanced. Bolsonaro’s movement is likely to gain new momentum, with hopes of a political comeback fueled by Trump’s success. However, President Lula’s position is more complex. Lula’s first term witnessed surprisingly positive ties with George W. Bush but more strained relations with Barack Obama. In short, history shows that Lula is pragmatic and deals rather well with Republican presidents who are generally uninterested in getting deeply involved in Brazil—and generally leaves it alone to pursue its global agenda. Trump’s scepticism toward the US-led post-World War II global order could be useful for Lula’s ambitions for a multipolar world, with a retracting US. Yet, Trump’s protectionist policies could also present significant challenges for Brazil’s economy, particularly affecting exports such as steel and agricultural products, potentially leading to political strain.

In my opinion, opportunities may arise if the US decides to invest in regional infrastructure, potentially with support from multilateral development banks. Such initiatives could address the underlying drivers of migration and reduce Chinese influence. If pursued, this strategy would enable the US to address migration and geopolitical challenges more effectively. This is not mere wishful thinking—back in 2020, Trump nominee to the Inter-American Development Bank Mauricio Claver-Carone had already mentioned a similar vision.

"What does a second Trump presidency mean for US military policy and for climate change?"

Professor Neta Crawford (Montague Burton Chair in International Relations)

The next Trump administration has promised to increase military spending. I suspect they will do so, even though such an increase is likely unnecessary from the perspective of meeting any military challenges in the near term. The Russians are depleted by their war in Ukraine, and China does not pose a significant military threat that cannot be dealt with by existing spending. Trump will in all likelihood be more bellicose with China and this may mean that they react by building up their forces. At that point, the US will likely then increase its own spending and armament. This is a security dilemma spiral.

Regarding climate change, the next Trump administration will be a disaster for the world in the short and long term. Its growth in military spending will lead to increased greenhouse gas emissions, its policy of burning as if there were no tomorrow, and its hostility to renewables will set the world back in terms of meeting its emissions reduction goals. The hostility to regulating methane emissions is also foolhardy. More militarization will also lead to other nations' military emissions increasing. Some of the states within the US will react by enacting local restrictions on emissions, as they did in the first Trump administration. But overall, the pace of US emissions reductions will decline. We can't afford that as a planet.

"What does a second Trump presidency mean for the relationship between democracy and capitalism?"

James Conran (Departmental Lecturer in Public Policy)

If the stock market is any authority, Trump’s victory has been a welcome tonic for American capitalism—and the world’s richest capitalist clearly agrees. This may come as a surprise to those of us who assume businesses depend on stable governance and global market conditions that seem favoured by neither Trump’s hostility to trade and immigration nor his erratic (to put it kindly) personality. Investors’ sanguine response can be attributed in part to relief that the election had an immediate and uncontested outcome, unmarred by the kind of violence Trump might have (again) unleashed had he been defeated at the ballot box. But markets also thrived during Trump’s first term—the traditional Republican priorities of tax cuts and deregulation outweighing the impact of trade skirmishes with China (since intensified under the Biden administration into something more like a real “trade war”). Perhaps they simply expect more of the same.

As for the awkward cohabitation of democracy and capitalism: this was not a referendum on the mode of production, and American democracy actually remains both protected and limited by the institutional straitjacket of the court-interpreted Constitution. Nevertheless, the first true popular endorsement of Trump’s brand of “national capitalism” shows again that the two can still manage to keep the show on the road. Perhaps the appropriate analogy is that of an aging couple who know—and often exploit—each other’s flaws and vulnerabilities but ultimately can’t quite envisage any more tolerable alternative arrangement—for the time being…

"What does a second Trump presidency mean for the state of democracy worldwide?"

Professor Giovanni Capoccia (Professor of Comparative Politics)

On the question of the implications for democracy worldwide of Trump's victory, I believe there is a twofold implication. First, the foreign policy of autocracies will be reinforced, to the extent that it does not conflict with the US interests—in other words, Trump's victory will certainly be a boon for Putin in the Ukrainian war and a bane for the European Union's interests of helping Ukraine resist Russia's attack. China may find a strong adversary in Trump for its plans on Taiwan, although it is probably too early to make predictions in that respect. Second, Trump's victory will certainly embolden the radical right in every liberal democracy. This will certainly have effects on the stability of democracies around the world. 

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It is hard to accurately predict what these next four years will hold for the United States and the world, but Oxford experts agree significant changes are on the horizon. During his campaign, Trump promised to reinvigorate the American economy, severely limit immigration, and end the conflicts in the Middle East and between Russia and Ukraine. As Oxford experts suggest, it remains unclear whether Trump’s rhetoric will translate into effective policies for achieving his administration’s goals. As a result, we must wait and see what Trump's return to the presidency will mean for the world. 

The Psychological, Economic, and Social Impact of Amnesty on Migrants and Society

Yu Furukawa | News contributor

Introduction 

In the presence of a massive influx of undocumented migrants, countries sometimes implement an amnesty, granting legal immigration status to these migrants. This blog examines the potential advantages and disadvantages of such amnesty programs and discusses how they can be addressed.

This blog suggests that

1. Implementing an individual-based application can help prevent informal employment and exploitation by employers.

2. A temporary amnesty that only offers short-term legal status for staying and working will just lead migrants to revert to an undocumented status. Providing a pathway to permanent residence after amnesty can prevent them from ending up in that situation.

3. Combining amnesty with other policies is necessary to address other factors of undocumented migration.

4. Minimizing the welfare state burden caused by amnesty can be achieved through vocational training.

5. Requirements need to be designed in a way that controls the number of applications.

6. It is important to be mindful and proactive about the administrative capacity needed to process amnesty applications. 

Amnesty is not a monolithic concept and can be classified into various types. 

de-facto vs one-shot : Amnesty can be defined as part of regularization or legalization, which can be classified mainly into two categories. One is de-facto regularization, which refers to the automatic provision of permanent residency to immigrants after they have lived in a country for a certain duration of years (Levinson, 2005a). The other is known as “one-shot” or ”one-off”, which targets a limited number of immigrants. It often targets particular categories of people by establishing specific residence and work requirements (Levinson, 2005a). It also often establishes a precise timeline with application deadlines. This blog will mainly focus on the latter, the “one-shot” amnesty.

Types of permits : Some amnesty yields permanent residence, while others provide temporary residence with a limited duration (Levinson, 2005a). Some amnesty programs also issue temporary work permits.

Beneficiaries : Who counts as “irregular migrants”?  They can be classified based on the intersection of entry, stay, and work status. The most common types include “Persons who never had a regular status because they entered illegally and could not find a way of regularizing their status”, “Persons who entered on a tourist visa and working irregularly”, and “Persons who lose their residence status because they no longer satisfy the conditions that initially granted the permit” (Spencer and Triandafyllidou, 2022). While there are various other types of 'irregular migrants,' such as children whose parents also lack legal status, this blog will focus on the three mentioned above, as they are the primary targets of amnesty worldwide, with some exceptions.

The following section examines the advantages and disadvantages of amnesty , as well as the questions that governments need to address before implementing amnesty. 

Advantages and Disadvantages 

Well-being and Psychological Effects on regularized migrants 

Amnesty can have a positive impact on the mental health of regularized migrants. Undocumented  migrants often experience mental health challenges because of the harsh working conditions in the informal sector, restricted access to housing and healthcare, and fear of policing, detention and deportation (Benach et al., 2011; Qureshi, Morris, and Mort, 2020). However, obtaining legal immigration status can alleviate some of these psychological burdens to some extent, as showcased by some empirical studies (Patler and Laster Pirtle, 2018; Refle et al., 2023).

Impacts on Migrants’ Economic Integration 

Another advantage of amnesty for its beneficiaries is its potential to facilitate economic integration into the host society. Deiana, Giua, and Nisticò (2022) showed that migrants regularized by the amnesty are more likely to secure formal sector employment a decade later, as compared to those who were ineligible for amnesty.

However, poorly designed amnesty may fail to reduce informal employment and even generate further informal employment among undocumented migrants. This is because (i) employers are unwilling to pay higher wages to legalized workers and demand more undocumented migrants or want legalized migrants to still work informally (Levinson, 2005b); (ii) migrant or familial networks enable migrants to obtain informal jobs more easily; (iii) working in the formal economy is not always viable for migrants because of a mismatch between their skills and the skills required for available jobs, as well as limited job opportunities and stagnant economic conditions, even after they are technically allowed to work formally. Thus, unless amnesty is well-designed, it is probable that regularized migrants will continue or choose to work in the informal sector.

To make regularization appealing and beneficial to undocumented migrants, governments can consider implementing several policy tools. Firstly, it is important not to limit the range of jobs available to them. It is further advisable for governments to provide job seeking assistance and vocational training to enhance their job opportunities. Furthermore, governments should carefully consider the timing of the program in order to avoid a time when the economy is stagnant and the high unemployment rate is high.

When an amnesty application is tied with employer’s assistance or sponsorship, amnesty might look unattractive and daunting for employers as well. This is because keeping migrants undocumented allows employers to pay lower wages than the minimum wage and avoid paying social contributions typically required for legal employees, in addition to the costs associated with the application. As a result, some undocumented migrants may struggle to find a sponsor.  Even worse, employers might exploit undocumented migrants. They might make migrants pay an application fee that is supposed to be paid by employers, sell labor contracts in exchange for application assistance (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, 2022). Thus, involving employers in the application process can result in adverse outcomes for migrants. Therefore, governments should consider implementing a migrant-independent application process rather than an employer-tied one. For example, the amnesty program called “Operation Papyrus”, Geneva in Switzerland, allowed undocumented migrants to apply for residence permits without the support of their employer, only requiring  them to ‘self-declare’ their current working relationship with employers (Bouvier, 2020). In doing so, governments opened up the amnesty opportunities for migrants who are in exploitative relationships and cannot seek application support from employers.

Impact on “Irregular” Migration Deterrence : Further “Irregular” Migration? 

It is also important to consider how amnesty impacts the undocumented migration landscape. One of the primary arguments against amnesty is that it can serve as a pull factor for further undocumented migration. However, many of these arguments lack counterfactual analysis (Walsh and Sumption, 2023), leaving out other factors influencing undocumented migration. It is possible that undocumented migration would have increased even without an amnesty program. The reality is more complex in the sense that there might be other factors. For example, Orrenius and Zavodny (2003) found that the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which granted amnesty to nearly 2.7 million undocumented migrants in the United States (Levinson, 2005b; Walsh, 2020), did not alter long-term patterns of undocumented migration from Mexico. This suggests that other factors, such as lowered wages in Mexico and the depreciation of the US dollar, are driving undocumented migration.

However, there are two things to bear in mind about the impact of amnesty in relation to undocumented migration. Firstly, amnesty which grants only temporary permits may lead to an

increase in the number of undocumented migrants because migrants may choose to remain even after the permits expire, anticipating future amnesty (Reyneri, 2004; Levinson, 2005b). If an amnesty program only provides temporary legal status, regularized migrants are likely to return to undocumented status again. When their permit expires, they tend to choose to remain without legal status and wait for the next amnesty rather than return voluntarily to their countries (Levinson, 2005a). As a result, they may repeatedly experience psychological stress and a lack of well-being due to their (re)undocumented status, as discussed in section 3-1.

Conversely, immediately granting permanent residence can lead to a high volume of applications and draw public criticism. Therefore, it is necessary for governments to carefully decide the types of status and pathway that should be given. One compromise is to establish a pathway to permanent residence based on criteria such as the duration of work or residence after the amnesty, language skills, and the degree of social and economic integration (Levinson, 2005b; Desmond, 2021). 

Secondly, amnesty is just a makeshift policy that temporarily reduces the current number of undocumented migrants in the country without addressing other variables of future undocumented migration. It does not deal with the structural factors driving undocumented migration into countries, so it is questionable whether amnesty has a positive impact on curbing the number of undocumented migrants in the future (G. Papademetriou, 2005). Therefore, if governments seek to reduce the number of undocumented migrants, what is necessary is to explore complementary policies addressing structural factors driving contemporary and future undocumented migration. Examples include establishing and expanding legal migration channels and fostering cooperation with origin and transit countries (G. Papademetriou, 2005). 

Impact on Economy

Amnesty may cause competition between native workers and newly regularized migrants. The aim of amnesty is to reduce the size of informal employment and generate a massive workforce in the formal sector, which could potentially compete with native workers. In reality, however, amnesty programs do not necessarily negatively impact native workers in the formal sector, as they often fail to send migrants into formal employment (Bahar, Ibáñez, and Rozo, 2021). Regularized migrants may find it unattractive to get a formal job if there is an additional cost or if it is unclear if they can get a formal job, even if they are permitted to work in the formal sector.

Another economic concern about amnesty is its financial burden on native taxpayers. Some argue that regularized migrants may obtain access to the welfare state, including education, health, housing, and welfare benefits, which can be a burden on native tax papers (Migration Watch UK, 2019).  While migrants’ net fiscal contributions through taxes may somehow offset these costs, it is reasonable to assume that they are less likely than other migrants to make significant fiscal contributions since regularized migrants are more likely to face long-term unemployment, as Gordon, Scanlon, Travers, and Whitehead (2009) showed. As a result, they tend to be more dependent non welfare benefits (Casarico, Facchini and Frattini, 2016). 

Therefore, it is necessary to consider to what extent this burden can be mitigated by their economic contribution. One possible way to alleviate the burden is by partially restricting the welfare benefits to them. For example, governments can provide fewer housing benefits to regularized migrants compared to the native population. However, these restrictions are often criticized by humanitarian organizations because these benefits play a pivotal role in migrants’ integration. .Therefore, the extent to which it has to cut the benefit should be carefully calculated based on the revenue migrants can generate, such as tax revenue or health insurance.

Another strategy is to directly enhance migrants' economic contribution. This includes implementing vocational and language training for them. It is the less competent skill sets of regularized migrants that make them more reliant on welfare benefits. By directly improving their skills and language ability, the government can enhance their probability of employment in well-paid and highly skilled jobs. 

Taken together, to evaluate the overall economic impact of amnesty, it is necessary to consider how many regularized migrants will end up working in the formal sector and how much fiscal contribution they will make.

Administrative Burden

Another disadvantage is that amnesty can cause administrative chaos. A lack of preparation, such as staff shortages, can lead to backlogs, slow processing, and even a downward revision of the final number of migrants actually regularized, as exemplified by Portugal’s 1992 regularization program, which only regularized 38,000 migrants out of 80,000 applicants (Levinson, 2005b).

To effectively implement amnesty and handle the expected number of applicants, it is necessary to ensure that governments have a sufficient capacity to handle amnesty-related administrative tasks. This involves mobilizing and training enough staff (Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, 2022; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler, 2009). It is also desirable to collaborate with NGOs and immigrant communities who are familiar with the size of migrants residing in local communities. Moreover, while many amnesty programs have technical requirements, such as proof of residence and duration of stay, not all criteria follow this pattern, and the judgment of officials is necessary. However, administrative discretion can lead to heightened bureaucratic costs.

The administrative burden can be also affected by how strict the requirements for amnesty are. Although setting excessively stringent criteria can lead to the unwanted exclusion of undocumented migrants, setting requirements can help control the number of applications within administrative capacity. Here are two requirements to consider in particular: 

Employment-related requirements : employment-related requirements have an impact on the number of applications. Stricter requirements may present obstacles for migrants who are considering applying. Whether it is formal or informal employment, proof of employment can be one of the requirements. While proof of sponsorship by employers could also be a potential requirement, involving employers in the application system may lead to further exploitation of undocumented migrants, as mentioned earlier. 

Duration Requirements: Establishing a requirement for applicants to have resided in the country for a certain period of time can help governments to control the number of regularization to some extent.  If the amnesty occurs shortly after a massive influx of undocumented migrants and they are the target for the program, a substantial number of applications will be expected. Conversely, setting the relatively lengthy residence requirement can reduce the number of applications. The restrictiveness of residence requirements should be determined based on the anticipated number of applications. Many amnesty programs have historically used a specific date as a reference point (Levinson, 2005b). If migrants entered the countries after this date, they would not be eligible for the amnesty program. There is no ideal minimum duration requirement because immigration situations vary between counties. However, a method used by JCWI (2021) could potentially be useful to determine an appropriate duration. They conducted sampling and surveys of undocumented migrants. While it is difficult to capture all undocumented migrants, sampling is possible. This approach can provide data on the percentages of undocumented migrants residing in the country for various durations. This allows to estimate the threshold duration needed to regularize different percentages of undocumented migrants. 

Conclusion

Amnesty can have a positive impact on migrants' mental health and economic integration as well as temporary reduction of undocumented  migrants. However, poorly designed amnesty programs can result in regularized migrants remaining in informal employment, perpetuating or even increasing the number of undocumented migrants, and creating welfare state burden. 

To maximize the advantages and minimize its disadvantages, governments should consider the following aspects. Firstly, to prevent a return to undocumented status or informal employment and to protect migrants from exploitation by employers, it is necessary to conduct vocational training for migrants and adopt an migrant-independent application system. Secondly, to reduce the number of undocumented migrants in the long run, it is important to establish a pathway to permanent residence and combine amnesty with other policy options . Thirdly, in order to minimize the burden on the welfare state, it is important to maximize the economic contribution of regularized migrants through vocational training and language training . Fourthly, to process applications smoothly, it is crucial for governments to control the number of applications by setting appropriate requirements and being aware of administrative capacity. 

References

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The threat of on-chip AI hardware controls

Jai Vipra | CyberBRICS Fellow, Center for Technology and Society, FGV Direito Rio

Introduction

Computational infrastructure is one of the most important constraints on AI development. Chips used to train and run AI models are expensive to produce and supplied by an extraordinarily concentrated market via a complex international supply chain. 

Recently, governments have become concerned about the strategic value of AI. This strategic value has two dimensions: one, that AI can potentially function as a lever of innovation and economic development, creating an advantage for any country that controls it [1]. Two, that AI can provide direct defence or military advantage through its use in surveillance and weapons systems [2]. Separately, potential security risks can arise from the malfunctioning, misuse, or malicious use of AI. These considerations have led to the United States’ restrictions on the export of the most advanced AI chips to China [3].

Against this backdrop, some analysts have recommended a policy of intervening at the design and manufacturing stages of AI chips to include hardware modifications to achieve policy goals [4]. This policy – hereafter “hardware controls” – is specifically recommended as a way for the United States to maintain its advantage in advanced chip design technology in relation to China and the rest of the world. It is also discussed to ensure that the ultimate control over AI development remains with a government (de facto the US government) [5]. 

The fact that all the most advanced AI chips today use American technology at some point in their value chain would allow the US government to unilaterally impose hardware controls by making them a condition of export. Existing export controls on semiconductor technology follow this route as well, invoking the foreign direct product rule (a regulation under the US Department of Commerce) and using it to disallow any semiconductor manufacturing company anywhere in the world from serving any Chinese design company to make AI chips [6]. China has already initiated a dispute at the WTO against these export controls, accusing the United States of using export controls meant for global security and non-proliferation, in the service of commercial technological leadership [7].

Hardware controls are conceived as an extension of these export controls that would include the ability to monitor and modify the use to which AI chips are put. They can allow a third party to monitor the kind and level of usage for a given chip or a cluster of chips; they can also allow them to remotely shut down the functioning of chips and therefore of an AI system [8]. In a sense, hardware controls are a kind of technological protection measure (TPM) [9], but unlike well-known applications of TPMs like paywalls, read-only controls, and watermarks, they are not being proposed (at least overtly) primarily for the protection of commercial interests through intellectual property. As we shall see, they might end up primarily protecting intellectual property for commercial reasons anyway.

The primary justifications provided for hardware controls include making chips “secure” and “governable” [10]. Sastry et al. (2024) mention some risks related to hardware controls, in particular the risks of security, privacy, and abuse of power [11]. They also contend that some risks, especially those affecting national security, might be so large as to call for ex-ante measures like hardware controls. This article challenges this primacy of national security and provides an analysis of the problems presented by hardware controls, even if they were to be safeguarded from data security and privacy harm. 

Problems posed by hardware controls

Undue surveillance and government control

It is well-known that government control over certain aspects of technology can lead to a function creep – the extension of a law, rule, or technology beyond its intended purpose [12]. For instance, facial recognition technology can be introduced to police departments as a tool to find missing children, but soon ends up being used for mass surveillance [13]. Effective hardware controls would make it possible and perhaps even easy for governments to monitor and shut down any computing activity that is considered inconvenient or dangerous. This can include even normal commercial activity under a state that favours certain corporations over others. 

Commercial control

The latter concern above is one of the over-regulations of commercial computing activity. A certain degree of openness in both software and hardware has been, and continues to be, crucial to computational progress. Bob Young, then CEO of open-source software provider Red Hat, noted in the introduction to ardent open-source advocate Eric Raymond’s influential 1991 book The Cathedral and the Bazaar that the computer hardware industry innovated much faster than the computer software industry because hardware was freer [14]. In contrast, software controls like digital rights management (DRM) have created locked consumers in to certain providers by making moving to another provider onerous, concentrated various markets (especially in entertainment), and led to obsolescence and the impossibility of preserving “protected” intellectual material [15]. 

Regulation is not well-suited to determine where exactly in the supply chain open source might add most value. The concepts of hardware freedom and free and open source hardware (FOSH) have served as a rallying call around the concerns of government overreach and inappropriate propertization of hardware technology [16]. Some developers have even coalesced around somewhat similar ideas in the realm of chips, under the Free and Open Source Silicon Foundation [17]. The “right to repair” movement also responds to the closedness of devices and the loss of consumer control over the use of devices [18].

This is not to say that the opposite of hardware controls is open hardware; however, central to the vision of proponents of hardware controls is a system of temporary licences that allow the hardware provider, or a third party, to determine the purpose and manner of hardware use.  

Efforts to limit the use of products once they are sold have been controversial. In The End of Ownership (2016), law professors Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz describe the erosion of personal property in the digital age, with providers of goods and services arguing that licensing allows them to arbitrarily delete or control the goods and services provided [19]. Instituting hardware controls means that chip designers, fabricators, and/or the US government will be able to determine the purposes and manner in which advanced AI chips are used. This creates entirely arbitrary restrictions on the ability of commercial or even academic entities to train AI models in the direction they seek. In the context of a very concentrated AI market, such controls do not bode well for new competitors and consequently for innovation.

Distrust in international relations

Importantly, some researchers consider the concentration in hardware markets desirable because it makes these markets easier to regulate, prevents a reckless race in hardware development, and preserves US hegemony over advanced computation. Certainly not everyone shares this desire for US hegemony, and the implications of one government determining what the entire world can do in terms of advanced AI training are not discussed, but these implications are wide-ranging [20]. For this reason alone it is important to counter these efforts. However, the same researchers also claim that hardware controls can “widen the space of possible [international] agreements and policies by providing a trustworthy verification platform” [21]. “Trustworthy” here is used in a technical sense: countries could potentially mutually monitor AI training activity in one another’s territory and use hardware controls to “trust” their own monitoring. 

The larger question of trust is ignored in this hypothetical. If the United States can unilaterally impose hardware controls on advanced chips, there is no manner of verifying that it also does not manufacture (or allow to be manufactured) chips that cannot be monitored, or that it does not create backdoors to monitoring known only to itself. There is an even larger question of trust in international relations: in an environment of intense rivalry between the US and China, and plummeting faith in the rules-based international order in the Global South, unilateral actions aimed at depriving other countries of advanced general technology can hardly be expected to increase trust. International relations scholars have shown that trust is a precondition for international agreements rather than a result of them [22]. A cycle of misperceptions about the motives and actions of rivals in AI governance is already underway, threatening strategic stability [23]. Trust-building measures, in both the rationally calculated and emotive senses [24], must occur before an international agreement on AI governance is arrived at. 

Industrial policy is a legitimate goal, but US export controls on AI chips, as well as proposed hardware controls, conflate national security goals with industrial policy goals. This is a general characteristic of The US AI policy so far, which has not followed the US government’s general approach of distancing industrial policy from national champions [25].

The promotion of delinking

One consequence of growing mistrust in international relations is the delinking of technological systems. Biden’s February 2024 Executive Order to “protect Americans’ sensitive personal data” explicitly targets China’s AI development [26]. Russia and China already have independent digital markets and infrastructure, and all three countries have banned the use of some types of foreign technology in government work. After the US implemented export controls on advanced chips, China accused it of “unilateral bullying” [27]. While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken later stated that the export control measures were not meant to impede China’s progress, China has understood these measures as an imprimatur to develop its own advanced chip technology. It has since taken several steps to develop domestic capability for chip design and production, and has succeeded in important respects [28]. This success has come in spite of expert predictions that it would be nearly impossible with escalating export controls [29]. 

In the US, China’s successes in overcoming some aspects of export controls are used by many commentators to argue for further export controls, and indeed the call for hardware controls is an example of such a push. Here, we ought to examine an assumption that drives these calls – AI is economically and strategically useful, and so the US must limit China’s chip development. However, if AI is quite that economically and strategically useful, China will have extremely high incentives to dramatically increase investments in chip development if the US tries to restrict chip technology exports to China from all countries. In trying to restrict China’s access to advanced chips, the US might be spurring on China’s own delinked chip industry.

In addition, other countries are learning from this example and investing in their own semiconductor industries and in international projects to stave off geopolitical risk at least partially. Various countries including the US have been active in developing RISC-V, an open-source project for an instruction set architecture (ISA) - an interface between hardware and software used by chip designers. Using an open-source ISA reduces dependence on licensed ISA providers like Arm and Intel, and therefore India, China and the EU have been trying to advance its development [30]. All these actors consider such open-source projects as important for digital sovereignty.  

Delinking is not objectively undesirable. Paris Marx (2024) envisions a collective splinternet, without massive global platforms and with interoperability and open protocols [31]. Such a system would make regulation more striaghtforward because it does not pit single nation-states against global platforms. Parallel AI development in various parts of the world might prevent the rise and entrenchment of global corporate AI giants, make regulation easier for governments, and provide choices for consumers. Hardware controls intend to preclude such possibilities entirely, trying to leave the world with only US AI giants being able to develop advanced AI.

In any case, as argued earlier, hardware controls might render themselves ineffective by increasing incentives for delinking and growth in the semiconductor industries of target countries. While their primary purpose may be unfulfilled, their function creep will remain – the increased ability of governments to surveil individuals and corporations, and the increased ability of corporations to control hardware. 

Resisting hardware controls 

We have seen that there are compelling reasons to resist hardware controls. Unlike open-source projects of the past, in this case it is quite difficult for such resistance to arise from a dissident group of programmers. The semiconductor industry is highly concentrated, has heavily guarded intellectual property, and chip production requires enormous amounts of money [32]. Even the most successful open-source projects of the past have faced challenges due to illegality [33]. It is therefore incumbent upon policymakers and civil society to resist the implementation of these hardware controls in the first place. 

Once implemented, hardware controls will likely fail to reach their original objectives (some of which are not necessarily desirable), and can entrench government and corporate control over hardware. AI research is already concentrated in industry rather than academia, and government interests in AI are not always aligned with public interests in AI. Policymakers must look beyond short-term and vague fears over national security and consider the broader implications of hardware controls.

Endnotes

1. Amba Kak and Sarah Myers West, ‘A Modern Industrial Strategy for AI?: Interrogating the US Approach’, AI Nationalism(s) (AI Now Institute, 12 March 2024), https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/a-modern-industrial-strategy-for-aiinterrogating-the-us-approach.

2. Vincent Boulanin et al., ‘Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk’ (SIPRI, June 2020), https://www.sipri.org/publications/2020/policy-reports/artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk.; AI Now Institute, ‘US-China AI Race: AI Policy as Industrial Policy’, 11 April 2023, https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/us-china-ai-race.

3. Gregory C. Allen, ‘Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 November 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai.

4. Onni Arne, Tim Fist, and Caleb Withers, ‘Secure, Governable Chips’ (Center for a New American Security, 8 January 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/secure-governable-chips; Luke Muehlhauser, ‘12 Tentative Ideas for US AI Policy | Open Philanthropy’, Open Philanthropy (blog), 17 April 2023, https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/12-tentative-ideas-for-us-ai-policy/.; Gabriel Kulp et al., ‘Hardware-Enabled Governance Mechanisms: Developing Technical Solutions to Exempt Items Otherwise Classified Under Export Control Classification Numbers 3A090 and 4A090’ (RAND Corporation, 18 January 2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WRA3056-1.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Gregory C. Allen.

7. World Trade Organization, ‘China Initiates WTO Dispute Complaint Targeting US Semiconductor Chip Measures’, 15 December 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/ds615rfc_15dec22_e.htm.

8. Onni Aarne et al. 

9. A TPM is a technical tool that allows a provider or third party to restrict the kinds and levels of use of digital materials. Access-control TPMs include time limits like for digital movie rentals among other measures, and copy-control TPMs include, for instance, blocking downloads of streaming content. See for more: ‘Technological Protection Measures (TPM) - Fact Sheet | SFU Library’, Simon Fraser University, 2023, https://www.lib.sfu.ca/help/academic-integrity/copyright/technological-protection-measures. 

10. Onni Aarne et al.

11. Girish Sastry et al., ‘Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence’ (arXiv, 13 February 2024), https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2402.08797.

12. Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Concept of Function Creep’, Law, Innovation and Technology 13, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 29–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2021.1898299.

13. Jai Vipra, ‘The Use of Facial Recognition Technology for Policing in Delhi’ (New Delhi: Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 16 August 2021), https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/research/the-use-of-facial-recognition-technology-for-policing-in-delhi/. 

14. Bob Young, ‘Introduction’, in The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary, by Eric S. Raymond, revised edition (O’Reilly, 2001).

15. ‘DRM and the Secret War inside Your Devices’, in The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy, by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz (The MIT Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10524.001.0001.

16. See for instance: ‘Our Mission | FreeIO’, accessed 4 May 2024, http://freeio.org/about-freeio/our-mission/.

17. See: ‘FOSSi Foundation: The International Not for Profit Organisation Which Promotes and Protects the Open Source Silicon Chip Movement’, accessed 4 May 2024, https://fossi-foundation.org/.

18. See: ‘Learn About the Right to Repair’, The Repair Association, accessed 2 May 2024, https://www.repair.org/stand-up.

19. Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz, The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy (The MIT Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10524.001.0001.

20. Meredith Whittaker, ‘Social Media, Authoritarianism, and the World As It Is’, LPE Project (blog), 28 March 2024, https://lpeproject.org/blog/social-media-authoritarianism-and-the-world-as-it-is/.

21. Onni Aarne et al.

22. Brian C. Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 121 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 

23. Anna Nadibaidze and Nicolò Miotto, ‘The Impact of AI on Strategic Stability Is What States Make of It: Comparing US and Russian Discourses’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 6, no. 1 (2 January 2023): 47–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2023.2205552.

24. Torsten Michel, ‘Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Reflections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 4 (December 2013): 869–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111428972. 

25. Amba Kak and Sarah Myers West.

26. Griffin, Riley, and Jennifer Jacobs. ‘Biden Poised to Limit American Personal Data Going to China’. Bloomberg.Com, 7 February 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-07/biden-poised-to-restrict-americans-personal-data-going-to-china.

27. Swanson, Ana. ‘U.S. Tightens China’s Access to Advanced Chips for Artificial Intelligence’. The New York Times, 17 October 2023, sec. Business. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/17/business/economy/ai-chips-china-restrictions.html.

28. Patel, Dylan, Afzal Ahmad, and Myron Xie. ‘China AI & Semiconductors Rise: US Sanctions Have Failed’. SemiAnalysis (blog), 12 September 2023. https://www.semianalysis.com/p/china-ai-and-semiconductors-rise.

29. Gregory Allen.

30. Working group on open source hardware and software, ‘Recommendations and Roadmap for European Sovereignty on Open Source Hardware, Software and RISC-V Technologies | Shaping Europe’s Digital Future’, 8 September 2022, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendations-and-roadmap-european-sovereignty-open-source-hardware-software-and-risc-v.; Press Information Bureau of India, ‘India Launches Digital India RISC-V (DIR-V) Program for next Generation Microprocessors to Achieve Commercial Silicon & Design Wins by December’2023’, 27 April 2022, https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1820621.; Stephen Nellis and Max A. Cherney, ‘RISC-V Technology Emerges as Battleground in US-China Tech War’, Reuters, 7 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-china-tech-war-risc-v-chip-technology-emerges-new-battleground-2023-10-06/. 

31. Paris Marx, ‘Embrace the Splinternet’, Disconnect (blog), 2 May 2024, https://disconnect.blog/embrace-the-splinternet/. 

32. Jai Vipra and Sarah Myers West, ‘Computational Power and AI’ (AI Now Institute, 27 September 2023), https://ainowinstitute.org/publication/policy/compute-and-ai. 

33. Christopher Tozzi, For Fun and Profit: A History of the Free and Open Source Software Revolution (The MIT Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/10803.001.0001.

Impacts of the Ban on Asylum Seekers' Employment

Yu Furukawa

Many countries with asylum processes have adopted policies which restrict the access of asylum seekers to the labour market. For example, in the UK, asylum seekers are largely prohibited from working, although they can apply for a permit to work if they have been awaiting a decision for 12 months and are not considered responsible for the delay [1]. Granting asylum seekers, a work permit means allowing them to engage in paid and formal employment either at the time of application or after a certain period has elapsed. The granting of work permits to asylum seekers takes various forms, primarily distinguished by:

1. The duration asylum seekers must wait for the work permit to be approved.

2. The presence of a list of job restrictions that asylum seekers are allowed to engage in.

I evaluate the validity of the argument that supporting the employment of asylum seekers working would act as a ‘pull factor,’ for migrants, and also assess the impacts to the economies of host societies, as well as the well-being and integration of those with asylum.

Debunking the 'Pull Factor' Assumption for Asylum Seeker Migration

The common argument against allowing asylum seekers to work is that it might serve as a 'pull factor' for undocumented migration and asylum applications. However, the validity of this argument is questionable because it lacks counterfactual analysis [2], thereby failing to account for the various other factors influencing undocumented migration and asylum applications. It could be argued that irregular migration and asylum applications would have increased even without the ban on asylum seekers working.

This argument is further challenged by the fact that some asylum applicants are unaware of the challenges they will face in the labour market prior to migration or asylum application. One study [3] showed that, out of 246 asylum seekers surveyed, 72% were unaware prior to arriving in the UK that asylum seekers are not allowed to work. This data suggests that other significant factors influence migratory decision making beyond knowledge of work permits, such as the presence of family members and migrant communities, and host language proficiency. Additionally, research indicates that asylum applications experience a negligible decrease if at all when the unemployment rate increases or when a ban on working is established. For instance, Zetter et al. (2003) [4] noted that restrictions on work and welfare were introduced in Germany during the 1980s, yet applications increased and peaked in 1992.

Therefore, viewing work permits for asylum seekers as a ‘pull factor’ mistakenly assumes that migrants possess comprehensive knowledge about their economic rights prior to their journey and overlooks more complex dynamics in migratory decision-making, such as household dynamics, historical context, and transnational networks. To grasp these complexities and identify the accurate 'pull factor' and 'push factor', the combination of counterfactual analysis and qualitative research in origin countries and along migratory routes is advisable [5]. Depending on migrants' circumstances and social factors, there may be cases where a work permit can become a 'pull factor'. However, at the very least, it is advisable to be skeptical towards claims that it is an absolute 'pull factor'.

Unless there is a change in the structural factors driving in undocumented migration, asylum seekers will continue to arrive, even if work permits are granted to asylum seekers. Therefore, while simultaneously considering policies aimed at reducing undocumented migration, such as expanding legal and safe migration pathways, it is more feasible to encourage the employment of asylum seekers and mitigate their burden on the social welfare system, as I will discuss later.

Another Form of “Illegality”: Undocumented Stay and Work After the Asylum Refusal

While it is doubtful or at best context-specific about whether work permits can be a ‘pull-factor’ for undocumented entry, the issuance of work permits can lead to other forms of undocumented behaviour. In other words, it may contribute to neglect of the option of voluntary or forced return (removal). Allowing asylum seekers to work could strengthen their ties to the host country and make the prospect of returning less appealing [6]. Consequently, they might remain in the country even after their asylum claims have been rejected, without any legal authorization for residence or work.

This situation is sometimes addressed through the implementation of policies such as the one introduced in Sweden, where work permits are exchanged for a commitment to return in the event of asylum refusal [7]. By ensuring cooperation regarding return in the event of failed asylum claims, individuals can secure a work permit during the asylum process. This measure serves to deter undocumented stays and work following the refusal of asylum.

Economic Impacts

The economic impacts of allowing asylum seekers to enter the formal sector need to be evaluated from two perspectives: (i) the extent to which asylum seekers will make fiscal contributions to host societies and (ii) the extent to which the inflow of asylum seekers into the labour market will create competition with native workers. Asylum seeker participation in the labour market may yield short-term economic benefits. Lift the Ban (2020) [8] estimates that if half of asylum seekers awaiting asylum decisions for over six months were allowed to work full-time at the national average wage, the British government could gain £73.1 million annually from their tax and national insurance contributions. However, it is important to consider the degree to which asylum seekers will make net fiscal contributions, paying more in taxes than the costs of providing them with welfare benefits and public services. Given that refugees are less likely to make fiscal contributions than other migrants [9], asylum seekers are likely to follow the same trend.

Another aspect to consider is that granting work permits to asylum seekers may negatively impact native workers' employment and wages by creating competition between them. Braun and Mahmoud (2014) [10] found reduced native employment due to inflows of East German migrants to West Germany post-World War II. Also, Bahar et al. (2021) [11] observed negligible labour market effects in Colombia following a large-scale amnesty program for undocumented Venezuelan migrants, except for minor impacts on formal employment.  While these case studies do not specifically address asylum seeker situations, they can provide a rationale for governments to limit job options for asylum seekers and regulate the influx of asylum seekers into specific labour markets. Directing asylum seekers toward sectors facing labour shortages and where competition with native workers is unlikely might help mitigate adverse effects on the employment and wages of native workers.

However, the ability of asylum seekers to work does not always have a negative impact on native workers. This is because it depends on how many asylum seekers end up working. Asylum seekers often have difficulty finding a job and earning wages that are correspondent to their educational levels. According to a survey conducted by Lift the Ban (2020), 74% of respondents (UK asylum seekers) have secondary-level education or higher, and 37% have a university degree, which is only 5% lower than that of the rest of the UK [12]. Despite their educational attainment, they struggle to secure employment opportunities. According to the same survey, of the thirty-six people who applied for work permits after waiting for over 12 months, only eight were granted permission, and only two of them managed to find employment afterwards [13].

This result resonates with larger-scale data in 2022 from the Migration Observatory, which indicates that non-EU-born asylum seekers in the UK were more likely to be unemployed than those who migrated for employment, family, or study. While the unemployment rate among the former was 12%, it ranged among the latter from 2 to 6 per cent [14]. Moreover, even if asylum seekers secure employment, it takes time for them to earn wages commensurate with their educational level or equivalent to other types of migrants. For example, research shows that while the employment gap between asylum seekers and other types of migrants converges over time, those in weekly earnings and hourly wages do not narrow [15].

In sum, although granting work permits to asylum seekers may cause competition between them and native workers, it is crucial to keep in mind that asylum seekers would struggle to find a job. Therefore, how many asylum seekers will end up working and how much fiscal contribution they will make should be considered.

Psychological and Social Impact

Access to the labour market can have a positive impact on the mental health of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers often experience insecurity about their future and a sense of being stuck due to pending asylum cases. However, engaging in purposeful activities such as work might help them address these concerns [16]. Being able to work may facilitate the integration of asylum seekers including economic dependence, the improvement of living standards and social integration [17]. One study [18], through its interviews with refugees and migrants in the UK, demonstrated that most of them (the exact number was not specified) view work as a key component of integration. They perceive work as enabling them to establish the foundation for their livelihood. While the data presented is not solely limited to asylum seekers, it would be reasonable to assume that the findings also apply to asylum seekers.

Furthermore, granting work permits to asylum seekers can have a positive impact on other elements of integration such as the acquisition of language skills, and cultural values. For example, one survey [19] asked 207 migrants about the place where they learn the most about the British community and values, with 43% saying from the workplace, 15% from neighbourhood and community, and 15% from mainstream media. Here, it is crucial to consider how temporal and cumulative impact the integration of asylum seekers into the workforce. As Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2021) [20] argue, when asylum seekers face prolonged periods with limited access to jobs, their economic integration slows down.

Marbach et al. (2017) [21] conducted a study in Germany where a court decision led to a shorter employment ban period. They found that, five years after the waiting period was reduced, refugees who initially had to wait an extra seven months before entering the job market had employment rates about 20 percentage points lower. In this sense, it is advisable to allow asylum seekers to work at an early stage of their application if governments want to facilitate the successful integration of asylum workers into society

Conclusion

Viewing work permits for asylum seekers as a ‘pull-factor’ for undocumented migration and asylum applications overlooks situations where other factors play more significant roles. The exact effect of work permits, and the complex dynamics of migratory decision-making require counterfactual and qualitative analysis. To evaluate its economic impact, it is imperative to consider how many asylum seekers will end up working and how much fiscal contribution they will make. Regarding psychological and integration aspects, access to the labour market can have a favourable impact on asylum seekers' mental health and facilitate their integration into society if they are permitted to work early in the application process.

References

1. Gower, M., McKinney, C. and Meade, L. (2019). Should asylum seekers have unrestricted rights to work in the UK? UK Parliament [online] Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01908/.

2. Walsh, P.W. and Sumption, M. (2023). UK policies to deter people from claiming asylum. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/uk-policies-to-deter-people-from-claiming-asylum/.

3. Lift the Ban (2020). Lift the ban: Why giving people seeking asylum the right to work is common sense. London: Lift the Ban Coalition.

4. Roger Zetter, David Griffiths, Silva Ferretti, Martyn Pearl (2003) ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Asylum Policies in Europe 1990- 2000’, Home Office Research Study 259;

5. Walsh and Sumption supra reference 2.

6. Valenta, M. and Thorshaug, K. (2013). Restrictions on Right to Work for Asylum Seekers: The Case of the Scandinavian Countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 20(3), pp.459–482. doi:https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02003006.

7. Migrationsverket (2023). Asylum seekers who have a job. [online] www.migrationsverket.se. Available at: https://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Working-in-Sweden/Employed/If-you-are-in-Sweden/Asylum-seekers-who-have-a-job.html

8. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

9. Migration Observatory. (2023). Why the government’s economic Impact Assessment of the Illegal Migration Act tells us little about the Act’s economic impact. [online] Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/why-the-governments-economic-impact-assessment-of-the-illegal-migration-act-tells-us-little-about-the-acts-economic-impact/.

10. Braun, S. and Omar Mahmoud, T. (2014). The Employment Effects of Immigration: Evidence from the Mass Arrival of German Expellees in Postwar Germany. The Journal of Economic History, 74(1), pp.69–108. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022050714000035.

11. Bahar, D., Ibáñez, A.M. and Rozo, S.V. (2021). Give me your tired and your poor: Impact of a large-scale amnesty program for undocumented refugees. Journal of Development Economics, 151, p.102652. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102652.

12. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

13. Lift the Ban supra reference 3.

14. Fernández-Reino, M. and Rienzo, C. (2024). Migrants in the UK Labour Market: An Overview - Migration Observatory. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-labour-market-an-overview/.

15. Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2017). Differences in Labour Market Outcomes between Natives, Refugees and Other Migrants in the UK. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2920574.

16. Burnett, A. and Ndovi, T. (2018). The health of forced migrants. BMJ, p.k4200. doi:https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k4200.

17. Kierans, D. (2021). Integration in the UK: Understanding the Data. [online] Migration Observatory. Available at: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/integration-in-the-uk-understanding-the-data/.

18. Rutter, J., Latorre, M., and Sriskandarajah, D. (2008). Beyond naturalisation: citizenship policy in an age of super mobility, London: IPPR.

19. Migrants Resource Centre. (2018). Integrated Communities Strategy: MRC submission of evidence and response to the government green paper consultation

20. Ruiz, I. and Vargas-Silva, C. (2021). What Works for Improving Refugee Outcomes in High-Income Countries? Policy Insights for the UK. [online] The Centre on Migration, Policy & Society (COMPAS). Available at: https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/What-Works-for-Improving-Refugee-Outcomes-in-High-Income-Countries-Policy-Insights-for-the-UK.pdf.

21. Marbach, M., Hainmueller, J. and Hangartner, D. (2017). The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3078172.

The Necessity of Cluster Bombs in Ukraine’s Fight Against Russia

Autumn Perkey

At a café bombing on Oct. 5, 2023, 49 Ukrainians were killed. Ukrainian air defenses remain weak, and the continued Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure have damaged the electric grid and water supply in critical areas. Future aid packages need to be approved as swiftly as possible, and they should include any means necessary to defend against Russian adversaries, including cluster munitions. 

In July 2023, the U.S. sent a military aid package worth over $800 million, sent at a point in time when the Ukrainians were running out of options, including access to the necessary resources to defend. Amongst the aid sent, this included cluster munitions. Debates have arisen about whether the United States should send cluster munitions to aid in the fight against the Russian invasion. While there are considerable moral consequences and debates about their uses, Ukraine needs an aggressive aid package including the means to defend, which includes the use of cluster munitions. The aggression demonstrated by Russian forces warrants sending military aid packages that include any means necessary to assure Ukrainian defense, including sending the debated cluster munitions.

123 countries including the UK and Spain have outlawed cluster bombs, signing what’s known as the Convention on Cluster Munitions established in 2010, due to the potential harm to civilians. This can happen when the bombs land incorrectly or the fuse does not function properly. 

When the smaller bombs are released, they pose a risk of indiscriminately killing over a wide area. However, these bombs are not banned by the countries directly involved in the decision to use them, the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine. Russian forces have already been using cluster bombs in Ukraine, and the Russian counterparts have a failure rate of 30-40%. However, the failure rate of U.S. cluster bombs is only 1-2%. While there is a risk to civilians due to the potential failure rate, effective bomb damage assessment will help reduce these risks while providing necessary support against Russian atrocities. Balancing the use of cluster munitions with the protection of civilians is difficult, but in 2021 there were no reported deaths from initial cluster attacks. 

While effective bomb damage assessment may limit the collateral harm caused by cluster bombs, as of 2008 the United States has stopped producing them. Cluster munitions are not ideal against all targets, for example, standard unitary warheads are more effective against point targets like buildings. The use of cluster munitions by Ukraine has been limited in capacity. In their first use in March of 2022, Ukraine forces used cluster munitions near Husarivka, an agricultural village, near Russian military headquarters. During this strike, there were no reported deaths, and the target was a military one. In comparison, Russia has indiscriminately used cluster bombs throughout Ukraine leading to hundreds of civilian casualties. According to the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) estimates between February to July 2022, there have been at least 689 civilian casualties due to cluster bombs most likely associated with Russia’s indiscriminate use or when used improperly within cities are densely populated areas.  

As of 2021 149 civilians were harmed by cluster munitions worldwide. This statistic focuses on their use in urban areas, where the overall risk of collateral damage is always higher and is not their intended use. Feedback from the frontlines has asserted that rather than using the cluster bombs indiscriminately, Ukrainian forces have been using them effectively and targeted to break through Russian defenses. The areas in which these bombs are being used are cluttered with Russian antitank, antipersonnel mines and trip wires focusing on a military target, rather than civilian infrastructure and populated areas. 

In Ukraine, the case for using cluster munitions is strong. According to U.N.-backed investigations, there is proof of significant Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The original airstrike in Mariupol in 2022 killed hundreds huddled inside a theater. Along with this are the numerous strikes Russia has repeated against Ukrainian infrastructure leading to leaving civilians without heat and electricity during some of the coldest months. These direct abuses against international law, do not even begin to account for the widespread use of torture towards non-combatants by Russian forces, including women and children. 

From February 24, 2022, to August 13, 2023, 26,384 civilian casualties have been reported in Ukraine. At least 9,444 civilians died during the Russian invasion as well as 16,940 being injured. While these are the known deaths and injuries, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights of the United Nations anticipates that the actual numbers are much higher. Numerous civilian atrocities have occurred justifying the U.S. sending the debated cluster bombs back in July of 2023. The continued Russian terrorism, such as the October 5 strike warrants future aid packages that contain any means necessary for Ukrainian defense. These atrocities are unacceptable and warrant the use of the extreme bombs that were sent. While cluster bombs are outlawed by 123 countries, the potential harm of inaction necessitates the risk taken. Further delays in military support through back stocked cluster munitions, will likely lead to more humanitarian abuses by Russian forces, including the torture of civilians. 

Overall, Russian cluster munitions fail 169-176% more than the counterparts sent to aid Ukrainians. The failure rate, meaning the likelihood of unexploded bomblets remaining after a cluster bomb is launched, has come back from Ukraine at 2.35 percent, while this is not at the expected threshold of 1-2%, it is still significantly lower than the cluster bombs being deployed by Russian forces (30-40% failure rate). While the UK, Spain, and Canada have spoken out against the U.S. decision to send the cluster bombs, Germany’s president has said that he understands the U.S. decision and it should not be blocked. While Germany still defends its position against the use of cluster bombs in general, the statement has been made that if Ukraine no longer has the means to defend itself, it will mean the end of the country. In the case of the U.S.-sent cluster bombs, the ends necessarily justify the means. 

Currently, the Ukrainians are halted from pushing back the Russian adversaries in the eastern Donetsk region. Valergy Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s military commander-in-chief has attributed the halt to a lack of adequate firepower to break through Russian defenses. Additionally, this effort has been supported by Ukrainian President Zelensky as much-needed military aid. 

Feedback from Ukraine as of July 2023 to the White House is that the cluster munitions were being used quite effectively to push back Russian forces. While it is unlikely this weapon alone will lead to a victory, the reality is that to counter Russian utility and capability these tools are a necessary means to an end. The additional limitations exist in the fact that there are no other readily available weapons to provide the type of support cluster munitions can provide. Currently, the supply of cannon artillery that acts similarly to a fuse is at an all-time low, as well as the supply of MLRS rockets (which are currently out of production and have been for some time). 

Within two weeks of the first cluster munitions aid package, the fighting in Kupiansk remained rough, but with the benefit of additional tools of warfare, Ukrainian forces were able to hold the line against the Russian forces attempting to seek territory by targeting Russian armored vehicles. Kupiansk has been undergoing a regular bombardment of Russian artillery for months and is at risk of civilian death and collateral damage if Russian forces continue their advance upon the city. Cluster munitions can be used to deter the takeover of the city and possibly prevent and deter Russian bombardment and abuses. 

Critics of the cluster bombs are dealing with a primarily moral dilemma while ignoring the implications of war. The Ukrainians are fighting to survive against an immoral force and need to match capabilities to protect Ukrainian civilians during a brutish invasion. The reality we face is a tradeoff between providing military assistance to a population that is being tortured, raped, and victimized, or allowing the adversary to maintain an upper hand. Providing military aid may often be limited by what munitions remain in stock, if that option is limited to cluster munitions, and they are used effectively, it is better than no support at all as a defensively Ukraine will lead to a stronger Russian opposition which has proven a threat to civilians and civilian infrastructure. 

Canada and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

michael levinson | News Editor

Former Canadian Senator Douglas Roche spoke bluntly on Canada’s refusal to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). “No wonder Canada didn’t get elected to the UN Security Council.”

Roche echoes a growing refrain that includes the New Democratic Party (NDP), Green Party, Bloc Québécois, as well as notable Canadian politicians such as Lloyd Axworthy and Jean Chrétien, all urging Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to sign the treaty. But Trudeau remains defiant. He deemed the UN conference which devised it “sort of useless,” instructed Canada’s UN delegation to boycott the negotiations, and continually asserts that Canada’s NATO membership precludes its participation.

Is it unbecoming for Canada — the nation which spearheaded the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and one of the most steadfast historical advocates for non-proliferation — to resist these pressures? Seventy-three percent of Canadians think so. But even for doves, the answer should be “no”.

The TPNW’s ban on nuclear weapons does not serve Canadian interests because it would weaken the US’ ability to deter nuclear threats that protects Canadians and democracies at large. Research suggests that when leaders ignore the TPNW it does little to quell public pressures to sign. Trudeau should plainly address Canadians and set the record straight. He should acknowledge that the broad-based effort to ban nuclear weapons is well-intentioned but falls short due to its potential to limit deterrence mechanisms that have helped avoid a nuclear winter. Finally, Trudeau should explain that an outright ban helps even the field for revisionist powers such as North Korea to take advantage of a potential nuclear void.

In this new kind of prisoner’s dilemma, the TPNW places a greater onus on democratic states to disarm than authoritarian ones. But ‘taking the high road’ is not admirable — it is reckless. Canada must instead regain credibility on disarmament by focusing its efforts on encouraging the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The TPNW, which entered into force in 2021, aims to stigmatize nuclear weapons to the point where they no longer pose a viable threat. To achieve this, state parties agree to never develop, transfer, or in any way encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those that already have nuclear weapons must work towards their “irreversible elimination.” 

The TPNW can be seen as a good faith but idealistic way to deal with frustrations regarding the flagship treaty on nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A product of détente during the Cold War, the NPT permits the five UN Security Council veto states — the US, UK, France, China, and Russia — to keep their nuclear stockpiles with certain restraints. The rest give up their right to nuclear weapons entirely and agree to specific safeguards on nuclear energy. The NPT has been successful in limiting proliferation; there is an adage that most states comply with their treaty obligations most of the time. Overall, the NPT has made it less appealing and more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons.

But the pace of nuclear disarmament has been abysmal. The US and Russia have a combined 11,000 nuclear warheads, enough to end the world many times over. However, “if the sole goal of the global nuclear order were to avoid nuclear use, the obvious solution would be abolition.” Rather, nuclear-armed states believe nuclear weapons provide security in a challenging strategic environment. For instance, Canada’s involvement in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NATO, place it firmly within the US’ nuclear umbrella. Security guarantees, like those given to Canada by the US, have been shown to reduce the possibility of a state otherwise acquiring weapons on their own. While the NPT still espouses complete disarmament as a goal, it is premised on the idea that a nuclear hierarchy among states, or a global nuclear order, “has done its part to help keep the world from going over the precipice.”

Some supporters of the TPNW maintain that though opposition to the treaty is predictable, its overall effect is to give rise to a ‘nuclear taboo’ that will become so powerful it will soon be customary international law. If this is the primary mechanism through which the world gives up on nuclear politics entirely, it is doomed to fail. Customary international law (which applies to all states irrespective of treaty obligations) does not develop simply when a practice is widespread. For it to materialize, it must also satisfy opinion juris: meaning a state is engaging in that practice because it is believed to be international law. As Chatham House opined, “this is far from an automatic process […] even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence — so-called persistent objectors — will not be bound by it.”

Other supporters of the TPNW concede that while achieving a complete ban of nuclear weapons is unlikely, a universal treaty that is not accepted by nuclear-weapons states is better than none. The University of Melbourne’s Maria Rost Rublee, for instance, argues that while the landmine ban treaty has not been ratified by the US, the US has not deployed them for two decades. In that case, the normative power of the treaty has superseded its lack of universality.

But landmines are different from nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, their catastrophic effects are increasingly understood, mutually assured destruction looms large, and they are rarely embedded in conventional forces. Writing about Russia’s recent nuclear threats to Ukraine, Alexander Bollfrass said “fortunately, the foundation of international nuclear governance is more robust than is often assumed.” The NPT, for example, is complemented by various arms-control agreements, extended deterrence arrangements, and expectations of negative reinforcements like sanctions if nuclear norms are violated.

Given no nuclear-armed states have signed the TPNW, it will only serve to limit deterrence in practice. And as authoritarian states such as Russia and China are more immune to public pressures than democracies, it will primarily affect Western states’ deterrence capabilities. North Korea seems to have recognized this, voting in favour of establishing a formal UN mandate to commence negotiations for the TPNW in 2016. Kim Jong Un is taking advantage of our democratic processes — he is playing the West for a fool.

In several NATO countries, over 75% of respondents said they support the TPNW. If this support is translated in the ballot box, leaders will eventually give in. What would that mean? Contrary to what Justin Trudeau has claimed, there is a growing body of research showing that NATO members are not barred from signing the TPNW but must commit to giving up nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. So if a NATO member becomes a party to the TPNW, it would have to forfeit key defensive arrangements. Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, all host US warheads. While housing these weapons in Europe is a relic of Cold War strategy, “withdrawing them would send a dangerous message of U.S. retrenchment to would-be adversaries in Europe and beyond.” And as the war in Ukraine continues, some say that the weapons can be used as leverage in negotiations with Russia.

Further, although Canada does not house nuclear weapons, the TPNW’s prohibition of its members to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party,” may undermine Canada’s involvement in NORAD. The NORAD air defense agreement is premised on the fact that regardless of the speed of the disarmament process, “large nuclear arsenals still exist, deliverable by strategic ballistic missile, cruise missile or long-range aircraft capable of striking North America.” This fundamentally practical alliance will be effectively destroyed by signing the TPNW.

Increasing public pressure on democracies to sign the TPNW also comes at a time when North Korea is testing longer-range ballistic missiles, Iran remains a threshold power on the precipice of a bomb, China is developing its nuclear triad, and Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear capabilities with state-of-the-art hypersonic glide vehicles. It is unwise to cede the upper hand. To re-establish Canada’s credibility on nuclear disarmament while avoiding the TPNW, therefore, Trudeau should encourage the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals. Or, as was suggested for Japan (which is facing similar pressures to sign), Trudeau should make it a priority to invest heavily in a specific aspect of nuclear security, such as improving safeguards on nuclear energy.

Whatever the response, Trudeau must not ignore the TPNW — it is here to stay and is only gaining more momentum. It would also be prudent to continue to engage with UN conferences and TPNW meetings to further demonstrate Canada’s continued commitment to multilateralism.

That means embracing Canada’s diplomatic tradition, responsibly.