Mariya Heletiy, Ph.D.
In recent weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump has exhibited open hostility toward Ukraine. He has initiated direct peace talks with Russia which exclude Ukrainian representation. He has labeled Ukraine's President, Volodymyr Zelensky, a "dictator" and claimed that Ukraine was responsible for Russia's 2022 invasion. Furthermore, the Trump administration has tried to exploit Ukraine's vulnerable position to secure a deal granting the U.S. significant stakes in Ukraine's mineral revenues. The public row between Zelensky and Trump at the White House highlighted the hostile situation that Ukraine is facing today.
These developments severely undercut Ukraine’s bargaining position in a potential peace deal, and the mounting alignment between U.S. and Russia would increase pressure on Ukraine to accept unfavourable peace terms. As Ukraine recently agreed to a U.S. proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, it is important recognise that lasting peace can only be secured after fundamental military imbalances between belligerents have been addressed. Historical evidence from the Balkans and Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that military conflicts cannot be resolved through peaceful negotiations alone. While diplomacy can be a part of the peace process, it is rarely decisive. Depending on the complexity and scale of the military conflict, its resolution requires military interventions and often the establishment of temporary international administration or monitoring missions.
Analysis of Conflicts in the Balkans and Nagorno-Karabakh
In a recently published paper, I argued that none of the latest military conflicts in Europe were successfully resolved through diplomacy alone. Peaceful negotiations and cease-fire merely bought time for militaries to regroup and prepare for the counter-offensive, as interim agreements were never faithfully implemented. Negotiations were used by the stronger party to lock in military gains, anchoring demands and conditions in the final peace negotiations. Once a weaker party accepted unfavourable demands, these demands were rendered unnegotiable in future peace talks.
Wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh exemplify these dynamics. These conflicts were resolved either through military intervention (Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999) or temporary ceasefire agreements for regrouping (Croatia and Nagorno-Karabakh). Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo only ended after NATO military interventions, which laid down conditions for the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Kumanovo Agreement in Kosovo.
Both Croatia and Azerbaijan used a temporary ceasefire to regroup and later to take control over their temporarily occupied territories. In the former case, ceasefire agreements required the belligerent parties to withdraw troops from contested territories and impartial third-party peacekeeping troops to monitor the ceasefire. But these conditions were violated. The ceasefire gave Croatia time to prepare for Operation Storm, which allowed it to recapture almost all occupied territory within two years after the signing of the Erdut Agreement in 1995. The ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh and Bishkek Protocol signed in 1994 did reduce tensions and ensured a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-making force. But peace only lasted for three decades. As the military balance shifted in its favour over time, Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, took this territory under its control in 2023.
Resolving the Russian-Ukrainian War
As the conflicts in the Balkans and Nagorno-Karabakh suggest, a lasting resolution of the war in Ukraine is only possible if military strength supplements peace talks. Below, I examine the different scenarios for how the Russia-Ukrainian war could be resolved, short of complete military defeat of either side.
Scenario 1: Peace Through Ukrainian Strength
In this ideal scenario, Ukraine would achieve sufficient military strength to repel Russia’s invasion. This plan for establishing stable peace and security in Europe would entail a strong and secure Ukraine; security guarantees for Ukraine from its allies and Russia; strengthened European security and defence; and continued sanctions against Russia until all of Russia’s commitments are implemented. Western nations would continue supporting Ukraine with military aid, financial resources, and military personnel, as well as introduce stricter sanctions against countries and individuals supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine in any way. Ideally, Ukraine would be accepted as a full NATO member to obtain credible security guarantees from allies.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are examples of conflicts resolved through military strength. In Bosnia, NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force intervention after mass killings in Srebrenica led to the Dayton Agreement, while in Kosovo, financial sanctions against Serbia combined with NATO airstrikes during Operation Allied Force compelled the Kumanovo Agreement. Both agreements ended hostilities through cease-fires, peacekeepers, and disarmament. Although a NATO-style intervention in the Russian-Ukrainian war is unlikely, coordinated measures—tougher sanctions, military support, and readiness to intervene—could similarly force Russia to negotiate peace. Applying the Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina solution to Ukraine, the peace plan should include the following elements:
Strengthening Ukraine’s military capacity to ensure it can negotiate a peace agreement from a strong position. It would require Western allies to provide additional military (weapons and military personnel) and intelligence support to allow Ukraine to continue its fight against Russia.
A ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied territories of Ukraine, including those occupied in 2014. Both sides would need to make compromises, potentially involving territorial exchanges. For instance, Ukraine could trade its territorial gains in Russia’s Kursk for occupied regions in the East or South of Ukraine.
Establishment of a demilitarized zone (safety zone), removal of all army personnel and heavy artillery from these areas, and deployment of peacekeeping mission with proper mandate to intervene in case of violation of ceasefire agreement. The demilitarized zone can be established on either the temporarily occupied territories or both sides of the conflict line (the likelier option). The demilitarized zone should ensure that bordering areas are free from shelling with short-term missiles. If the parties do not agree to introduce a peacekeeping mission, the foreign peacekeeping troops with a substantive mandate and the US backup can be deployed in Ukraine to protect the border and critical infrastructure with possible engagement of warships and military aircraft to patrol borders and ceasefire. There is preliminary willingness from the UK, France, Turkey, Canada, Australia, and Ireland to deploy military personnel in case of reaching an agreement between Ukraine and Russia as a security guarantee. Should Russia oppose these measures, further diplomatic and military pressure would be required.
Security guarantees from allies. Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO is the best security guarantee, but in current circumstances, NATO membership seems to be impossible due to Trump’s sympathy for Russia’s demands. NATO membership can be replaced by Ukraine’s swift accession into the EU (earlier than 2030) and clear security guarantees for Ukraine from its European allies with the US backup. The guarantees should include military support from its partners, including air defence systems, capacity-building support to Ukrainian military personnel training and weapon production, and a clear set of actions in case of new aggression against Ukraine by any country (similar to how the US-led coalition supported Israel’s interception of Iranian missiles in 2024).
Credible demonstration of peaceful intentions by Russia. The Russian Federation should credibly demonstrate its intention to cease its aggression against Ukraine. It should withdraw troops from regions bordering Ukraine, reduce the size of its armed forces and military equipment proportionally to Ukraine’s reduction of the armed forces (in case of such demands from the Russian side), and compensate Ukraine and Western allies for all damage and losses (infrastructure, human loses and financial support to Ukraine from its partners) caused by the war. The compensation can be made directly by Russia or from the frozen Russian assets or resources (gas, oil, rare minerals, etc.)
Prosecution of all war criminals, including Russia’s top political leadership, military commanders, and soldiers, responsible for committing war crimes. The International Tribunal for Russia will be instrumental in achieving reconciliation and paving the way for restoring relations between Ukraine and Russia in the future. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) can serve as an example. ICTY had the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law and for committing crimes against humanity in the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia. The ICTY prosecuted war criminals from ordinary soldiers to prime ministers, presidents, and generals, including President Slobodan Milosevic. In addition, to improve relations with neighbours and achieve reconciliation, in 2004, Serbian President Boris Tadic apologised for the crimes committed in the name of the Serb people. The Tribunal on Russia can ensure accountability of war criminals and responsibility for aggression.
Restoration of human rights and freedoms on all territory of Ukraine and formerly occupied territories, return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees and guaranteeing their security; restoration of property rights (return of any property taken by unlawful acts or compensation for property that cannot be restored).
Exchange of prisoners and return of Ukrainian children illegally deported to Russia.
Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine under international observation. The elections can be held after martial law is lifted and peaceful agreement is reached.
Lifting of sanctions. Western sanctions related to SWIFT and Russian gas transportation through Ukraine’s territory can be lifted after both parties signing a peace agreement with Russian security guarantees. The lifting of other sanctions and unfreezing of Russian assets should be done only after compensation for war damage and the transfer of war criminals to the international court. Sanctions related to banning exports of technology Russia might use for making weapons have to remain in place.
To reach this type of agreement, Ukraine must be in a strong military position. It will require the international community to continue providing military support in needed scope and joint production of weapons (e.g., long-range missiles, military instructors and personnel, financial resources, etc.).
Scenario 2: Temporary Ceasefire
If it is not possible to reach a stable and lasting peace agreement, Ukraine can negotiate a temporary ceasefire along the existing frontlines, similar to Croatia. It will require an international military presence to monitor the ceasefire on both sides. The international personnel must be empowered with the capability and mandate to monitor the situation and intervene if needed.
A temporary ceasefire is acceptable only if Ukraine receives sufficient security guarantees, at least for the territory under the control of the government. The Ukrainian authorities and Western allies should also agree on the arrangement of military and financial support, deployment of peacekeeping mission in Ukraine to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure, air and marine patrolling, and Ukraine’s ability to prepare for future operations.
A pause in fighting will be used to exchange prisoners and negotiate a peaceful agreement between Ukraine and Russia. It will also allow Ukraine to regroup its Army, train new personnel, and arrange joint training with foreign troops in preparation for a coordinated operation in case of the ceasefire is violated or Russia invades again. The Russian Federation should remain under sanctions until stable peace and security are ensured.
Russia can demonstrate its readiness to negotiate by exchanging all prisoners, returning all deported children, and allowing the establishment of a monitoring mission under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) or UN auspices on the occupied territories to monitor the ceasefire and human rights adherence. The monitoring mission should exclude Russian observers, but the country can propose which countries to be present in the mission.
After a five-year transitional period, free and fair local elections—and possibly a referendum about the status of occupied areas—should be held under the observation of OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and other international organizations. Internally displaced people from these regions can participate in the elections as candidates or voters. After the establishment of the ceasefire and lifting of Martial Law, Ukraine should call for presidential and parliamentary elections (to be held separately in six months).
Scenario 3: Continued War
Because of the nature and scale of the war and the conflicting demands of both sides, it might be impossible to resolve the war through peaceful efforts. War might continue. Since Ukraine has three times fewer troops and weapons than Russia, it is unlikely to regain control over the entire temporarily occupied territories without external support. To force Russia onto the negotiating table, Western allies should continue to provide military and financial support to Ukraine (including the provision of weapons and military personnel) and maintain the sanctions imposed on Russia. The international military personnel can be deployed in the Western part of the country and in the Black Sea to contribute to military personnel capacity building and protection of air and maritime borders. The sanction policy can undermine Russia’s ability to produce any type of military equipment and force Russia to peaceful negotiations and concessions related to occupied territories, compensation for damage, and prosecution of war criminals. If significant geopolitical and political changes occur in Russia, Ukraine might reclaim its territories—much like Azerbaijan reasserted control over parts of Nagorno-Karabakh following shifts in regional dynamics.
Conclusion
Resolving international military conflicts demands a blend of severe sanctions, military support, and diplomatic pressure to compel negotiations and secure lasting peace. Post-Yugoslav conflicts show that while standalone sanctions and arms embargoes fail—due to black-market weapon flows—stringent financial measures combined with NATO interventions and cooperation with legal bodies like the International Criminal Tribunal can force aggressors to negotiate, as demonstrated when Yugoslavia’s sanctions were lifted in exchange for Milosevic’s transfer. However, ceasefires lacking genuine political will risk instability and may allow aggressors to enhance their military capabilities, potentially turning anticipated weaknesses into greater security threats. Moreover, border changes set important international precedents; for instance, despite the International Court of Justice ruling Kosovo’s independence lawful, its example is cited by Putin to justify Crimea’s occupation, indicating that any formal annexation in Ukraine could have far-reaching implications for future territorial disputes.
The ideal scenario for resolving the Russian-Ukraine war would entail the liberation of all occupied territories, compensation for the damage (resources for the recovery of Ukraine and accountability of war criminals), and security guarantees (e.g., limitations of the Russian defence industry, NATO membership or sufficient security guarantees). If this is not achievable, ceasefire can be a temporary solution if only it is supplemented by security guarantees, which would include a clear set of actions in case of violation of the ceasefire or a renewed invasion. In any case, any prospect of a just and acceptable peace would require weakening Russia’s military strength and improving Ukraine’s military balance. The aggressor must be deprived of the ability to secure further military gains against the victim.
