Canada and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

michael levinson | News Editor

Former Canadian Senator Douglas Roche spoke bluntly on Canada’s refusal to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). “No wonder Canada didn’t get elected to the UN Security Council.”

Roche echoes a growing refrain that includes the New Democratic Party (NDP), Green Party, Bloc Québécois, as well as notable Canadian politicians such as Lloyd Axworthy and Jean Chrétien, all urging Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to sign the treaty. But Trudeau remains defiant. He deemed the UN conference which devised it “sort of useless,” instructed Canada’s UN delegation to boycott the negotiations, and continually asserts that Canada’s NATO membership precludes its participation.

Is it unbecoming for Canada — the nation which spearheaded the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and one of the most steadfast historical advocates for non-proliferation — to resist these pressures? Seventy-three percent of Canadians think so. But even for doves, the answer should be “no”.

The TPNW’s ban on nuclear weapons does not serve Canadian interests because it would weaken the US’ ability to deter nuclear threats that protects Canadians and democracies at large. Research suggests that when leaders ignore the TPNW it does little to quell public pressures to sign. Trudeau should plainly address Canadians and set the record straight. He should acknowledge that the broad-based effort to ban nuclear weapons is well-intentioned but falls short due to its potential to limit deterrence mechanisms that have helped avoid a nuclear winter. Finally, Trudeau should explain that an outright ban helps even the field for revisionist powers such as North Korea to take advantage of a potential nuclear void.

In this new kind of prisoner’s dilemma, the TPNW places a greater onus on democratic states to disarm than authoritarian ones. But ‘taking the high road’ is not admirable — it is reckless. Canada must instead regain credibility on disarmament by focusing its efforts on encouraging the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals.

The TPNW, which entered into force in 2021, aims to stigmatize nuclear weapons to the point where they no longer pose a viable threat. To achieve this, state parties agree to never develop, transfer, or in any way encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those that already have nuclear weapons must work towards their “irreversible elimination.” 

The TPNW can be seen as a good faith but idealistic way to deal with frustrations regarding the flagship treaty on nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A product of détente during the Cold War, the NPT permits the five UN Security Council veto states — the US, UK, France, China, and Russia — to keep their nuclear stockpiles with certain restraints. The rest give up their right to nuclear weapons entirely and agree to specific safeguards on nuclear energy. The NPT has been successful in limiting proliferation; there is an adage that most states comply with their treaty obligations most of the time. Overall, the NPT has made it less appealing and more difficult to acquire nuclear weapons.

But the pace of nuclear disarmament has been abysmal. The US and Russia have a combined 11,000 nuclear warheads, enough to end the world many times over. However, “if the sole goal of the global nuclear order were to avoid nuclear use, the obvious solution would be abolition.” Rather, nuclear-armed states believe nuclear weapons provide security in a challenging strategic environment. For instance, Canada’s involvement in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NATO, place it firmly within the US’ nuclear umbrella. Security guarantees, like those given to Canada by the US, have been shown to reduce the possibility of a state otherwise acquiring weapons on their own. While the NPT still espouses complete disarmament as a goal, it is premised on the idea that a nuclear hierarchy among states, or a global nuclear order, “has done its part to help keep the world from going over the precipice.”

Some supporters of the TPNW maintain that though opposition to the treaty is predictable, its overall effect is to give rise to a ‘nuclear taboo’ that will become so powerful it will soon be customary international law. If this is the primary mechanism through which the world gives up on nuclear politics entirely, it is doomed to fail. Customary international law (which applies to all states irrespective of treaty obligations) does not develop simply when a practice is widespread. For it to materialize, it must also satisfy opinion juris: meaning a state is engaging in that practice because it is believed to be international law. As Chatham House opined, “this is far from an automatic process […] even if a rule is indeed created, states that have objected to a certain degree to its emergence — so-called persistent objectors — will not be bound by it.”

Other supporters of the TPNW concede that while achieving a complete ban of nuclear weapons is unlikely, a universal treaty that is not accepted by nuclear-weapons states is better than none. The University of Melbourne’s Maria Rost Rublee, for instance, argues that while the landmine ban treaty has not been ratified by the US, the US has not deployed them for two decades. In that case, the normative power of the treaty has superseded its lack of universality.

But landmines are different from nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945, their catastrophic effects are increasingly understood, mutually assured destruction looms large, and they are rarely embedded in conventional forces. Writing about Russia’s recent nuclear threats to Ukraine, Alexander Bollfrass said “fortunately, the foundation of international nuclear governance is more robust than is often assumed.” The NPT, for example, is complemented by various arms-control agreements, extended deterrence arrangements, and expectations of negative reinforcements like sanctions if nuclear norms are violated.

Given no nuclear-armed states have signed the TPNW, it will only serve to limit deterrence in practice. And as authoritarian states such as Russia and China are more immune to public pressures than democracies, it will primarily affect Western states’ deterrence capabilities. North Korea seems to have recognized this, voting in favour of establishing a formal UN mandate to commence negotiations for the TPNW in 2016. Kim Jong Un is taking advantage of our democratic processes — he is playing the West for a fool.

In several NATO countries, over 75% of respondents said they support the TPNW. If this support is translated in the ballot box, leaders will eventually give in. What would that mean? Contrary to what Justin Trudeau has claimed, there is a growing body of research showing that NATO members are not barred from signing the TPNW but must commit to giving up nuclear weapons stationed in their territory. So if a NATO member becomes a party to the TPNW, it would have to forfeit key defensive arrangements. Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, for example, all host US warheads. While housing these weapons in Europe is a relic of Cold War strategy, “withdrawing them would send a dangerous message of U.S. retrenchment to would-be adversaries in Europe and beyond.” And as the war in Ukraine continues, some say that the weapons can be used as leverage in negotiations with Russia.

Further, although Canada does not house nuclear weapons, the TPNW’s prohibition of its members to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party,” may undermine Canada’s involvement in NORAD. The NORAD air defense agreement is premised on the fact that regardless of the speed of the disarmament process, “large nuclear arsenals still exist, deliverable by strategic ballistic missile, cruise missile or long-range aircraft capable of striking North America.” This fundamentally practical alliance will be effectively destroyed by signing the TPNW.

Increasing public pressure on democracies to sign the TPNW also comes at a time when North Korea is testing longer-range ballistic missiles, Iran remains a threshold power on the precipice of a bomb, China is developing its nuclear triad, and Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear capabilities with state-of-the-art hypersonic glide vehicles. It is unwise to cede the upper hand. To re-establish Canada’s credibility on nuclear disarmament while avoiding the TPNW, therefore, Trudeau should encourage the US, China, and Russia to come together directly and negotiate a multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals. Or, as was suggested for Japan (which is facing similar pressures to sign), Trudeau should make it a priority to invest heavily in a specific aspect of nuclear security, such as improving safeguards on nuclear energy.

Whatever the response, Trudeau must not ignore the TPNW — it is here to stay and is only gaining more momentum. It would also be prudent to continue to engage with UN conferences and TPNW meetings to further demonstrate Canada’s continued commitment to multilateralism.

That means embracing Canada’s diplomatic tradition, responsibly.