Owen Au
While China’s growing military threat to Taiwan captures international attention, its subtle yet persistent united front campaign often goes unnoticed.
Last month, a documentary released by Taiwanese bloggers revealed that the Chinese authority is offering identity cards to Taiwanese citizens in China. The revelation shocked many in Taiwan because it demonstrates that China’s united front strategy has silently entered a new phase. In line with its decade-long efforts to attract Taiwanese to relocate to China, the distribution of identity cards highlights China’s attempt to further integrate these individuals into its society and jurisdiction. Amidst rising cross-Strait tension and China’s blatant ambition over Taiwan, the recent development could pose additional security implications to the island.
China’s United Front Strategy
The concept of the united front originated during the Russian Revolution in the early 20th century. It involves forming broad coalitions with people, even if their goals and ideologies are not perfectly aligned, to overcome a common adversary. Mao Zedong later adopted this strategy as a prominent strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even after Mao’s death, the strategy is still deeply embedded in China’s national security system. Today, the United Front Work Department (UFWD), reporting directly to the CCP Central Committee, plays a pivotal role in not only cementing the CCP’s power domestically, but also accumulating its global influence through the infiltration of targeted countries.
Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway territory yet to be “reunified”, has long been a primary target of its united front efforts. The fact that many core members of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office have backgrounds in the UFWD highlights Beijing’s prioritisation of this approach when dealing with the “Taiwan question”.
Historically, China’s united front efforts in Taiwan had focused on “containing the government with business” (以商圍政). Following China’s economic reforms in the 1980s, its booming market attracted significant Taiwanese investment and businesses. Subsequent cross-Strait economic cooperation agreements in the 2000s further deepened Taiwan’s economic reliance on China, exposing Taiwan to Chinese economic coercion. For instance, Chinese authorities reportedly pressured Taiwanese enterprises operating in China to publicly endorse Beijing’s “One China Policy” and support pro-China candidates during Taiwanese elections. In 2012, the Want Want China Times Media Group, whose chairman has close ties to Beijing, launched media campaigns to defame scholars and student leaders who criticised the CCP. These incidents raised concerns in Taiwan over China’s growing influence through the business sector.
China’s united front strategy faced a turning point in the mid-2010s. During the Sunflower Movement in 2014, Taiwanese students and grass-roots organisations protested against further economic integration with China, compelling Beijing to reevaluate its approach. Two years later, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) being elected as Taiwan’s ruling party, which Beijing saw as die-hard “Taiwanese separatists”, China shifted its strategy from “containing the government with business” to “leveraging public pressure to influence the government” (以民逼官). The focus turned to weakening the DPP administration by building direct ties with the Taiwanese populace under the flagship of “Expanding People-to-People Exchanges” (扩大民间交流), marking the second phase of the strategy.
In February 2018, Beijing announced “31 Taiwan-related measures” (惠台31条措施) to attract Taiwanese students, entrepreneurs, workers, and families to China. By 2019, more than 12,000 Taiwanese were studying in China, and some estimated that over 600,000 were working there during the same period. Many cited China’s large market, diverse opportunities, and promising government support as huge incentives, with some even expressing willingness to identify themselves as Chinese if it meant they could make more money.
To facilitate integration, China established nearly 80 “Cross-Strait Integrated Development Demonstration Zones” (两岸融合发展示范区) and “Cross-Strait Entrepreneurship Bases” (海峡两岸青创基地). These areas offered Taiwanese generous subsidies for living and business expenses, drawing over 200,000 to cross the Strait. According to a Japanese documentary, Taiwanese entrepreneurs in these areas received not only direct funding for their businesses, but also housing subsidies and other benefits. A Taiwanese running his own business in one of these areas claimed he could double his income in China compared to Taiwan.
In August 2018, China’s State Council further announced that Taiwanese who had lived in China for half a year or more could apply for residential cards. While these cards do not offer official Chinese citizenships, they grant access to public services similar to those enjoyed by citizens, such as education, healthcare, and legal aid. The benefits made everyday life easier for Taiwanese in China, including in online transactions, banking and financial services, and even public transportation. Within two weeks, more than 22,000 Taiwanese had applied for these cards.
Of course, Taipei was uneasy about China’s move. In its response, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council criticised the release of the residential card as “another united front measure” to incorporate Taiwanese into China’s administrative system, thereby diminishing Taiwan’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, as the residential cards closely resemble the identity cards of Chinese citizens in terms of design and PIN code format, the Council also criticised China for intentionally creating confusion to blur the distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese citizens. Despite these criticisms, the Council reluctantly admitted that the measure did not violate the Cross-Strait Act, which prohibits Taiwanese from becoming citizens of China.
A New Phase of the United Front Strategy
Six years later, under the DPP’s third consecutive administration, a shocking documentary indicated China had taken its united front strategy to the next level. The film alleged that Taiwanese in China were encouraged to exchange their residential cards for Chinese identity cards, granting them full citizenship. Despite banning dual nationality, China reportedly told Taiwanese applicants that they could retain their Taiwanese passports, as Taiwan is considered part of China.
The documentary suggested that new incentives, such as buying houses and cars without down payments, were driving Taiwanese to seek Chinese citizenship. It claimed nearly 200,000 Taiwanese had already applied for the identity cards, with over 4,000 applications in process. While most of them simultaneously hold Chinese identity cards and Taiwanese passports, they were also reminded not to share their Chinese identity card on social media; otherwise, their Taiwanese citizenship may be cancelled due to the restriction placed by Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Act.
Many claims are hard to verify. However, as confirmed by some Taiwanese officials, Beijing has recently been eager to get those Taiwanese in China to apply for the “three documents”—the Chinese residential cards, bank accounts, and local mobile phone numbers—with many ending up receiving Chinese identity cards. Some Taiwanese content creators were also found to be showcasing their Chinese identity cards as early as 2021.
Some analysts draw parallels between China’s actions and Russia’s strategy in Georgia and Ukraine, where Russia granted citizenship to Georgians and Ukrainians and later invoked the pretext of “protecting” its citizens to justify military aggression. However, an imminent military invasion may not follow the distribution of Chinese citizenships. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, Taiwan maintains effective governance even in pro-China regions like Kinmen. Also, the scale of citizenship distributions is vastly different and not comparable.
Still, this united front tactic could significantly undermine Taiwan’s national security. Under China’s National Security Law, all citizens are obligated to safeguard national security, especially when it involves issues of “territorial integrity”. Additionally, its National Intelligence Law requires citizens to support and cooperate with intelligence efforts, effectively making them potential agents of the state. With these Chinese laws, Taiwanese with Chinese citizenship could turn into Chinese spies to undermine Taiwan’s de facto independence, or to subvert the “separatist” DPP administration, in order to safeguard China’s territorial integrity.
Through its strategy of “leveraging public pressure to influence the government” over the last decade, China has successfully established an extensive influence network within Taiwan. According to a report by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, China has intensified its infiltration efforts in recent years, with the number of prosecutions for espionage increasing four-fold since 2021. Targeting a wide range of individuals—from Taiwanese civilians, gangsters, and religious groups, to military personnel and governmental officers—China is determined to exert control over Taiwanese society from within. By issuing Chinese identity cards, China could convert members of its Taiwanese network into Chinese citizens, placing them under its jurisdiction and applying legal tools to compel those Taiwanese to act in favour of its national security and interests.
Moreover, the issue could challenge Taiwan’s jurisdiction. For example, if a Taiwanese holding a Chinese identity card became involved in a legal case, Beijing might claim the right to intervene even if the person was on Taiwan’s soil, further diminishing Taiwan’s sovereignty. Given China’s persistent claim on Taiwan as part of its territory, when the subject is legally a citizen of its own, its exercise of jurisdiction may arguably have more legitimacy under international law by fulfilling both the nationality and territorial principles.
Taiwan's government has responded by investigating individuals suspected of holding Chinese identity cards. Officials have vowed to revoke the citizenship of violators. However, only a handful of suspects have been identified so far, indicating a major obstacle Taiwan faces in countering China’s united front operation. Since Beijing severed virtually all official ties with Taipei and holds an overwhelming advantage in resources and intelligence, it remains a significant challenge for Taiwan to resist China’s infiltration.
Conclusion
China’s united front strategy continues to evolve, with identity card distribution representing just one facet of its broader campaign to undermine Taiwan’s democracy and autonomy. Despite China’s eye-catching rhetoric of “reunification with Taiwan by force”, military occupation is only a part of its agenda, and the united front operation will likely remain central to the overall strategy. While military threats capture global attention, the consequences of such ongoing operations shall never be underestimated.
Owen Au is an independent researcher, focusing on China’s diplomacy, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, maritime security and human rights.
