John connor
The unipolar moment is at its end. China’s rise, the resurgence of American isolationism, and India and Brazil’s economic and demographic growth all point towards the return of multipolarity in international politics. In a world no longer defined by traditional paradigms or unipolar U.S. hegemony, great powers must cultivate partnerships based not merely on Cold War era affiliations but also upon mutual economic and military self-interest.
The U.S. and India both can and should pursue cooperation based on mutual interests. By no means should the U.S. expect to form an alliance akin to current U.S. partnerships with South Korea, Japan, or Australia. These alliance-making models risk involving New Delhi in international confrontations where its national interest is not at stake. But there are extensive overlapping interests that make a strategic partnership viable. This can be accomplished by reinforcing existing military cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Himalayas, while also streamlining forums for trade talks and fully implementing the 2008 U.S.-India Civil-Nuclear Agreement. Through this combined civil, military, and economic approach, both countries can set a firm groundwork for future cooperation.
To counter China’s growing influence in South Asia, the U.S. can build upon its policy of reinforcing India’s military. Currently, the U.S. and Indian militaries work together via annual military exercises such as Yudh Abhyas (land forces) and Cope India (air force). Additionally, the Malabar naval exercises have expanded to include the Japanese and Australian navies. Both nations also cooperate to monitor international shipping and Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean.
At sea, better defensive postures against China can be achieved through U.S. assistance in upgrading India’s bases in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. By aiding Australia with its bases on its northern coast and the Keeling Islands, the U.S. can eventually hope to create a tri-national naval bulwark against Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific, leaving allied naval forces within striking distance of Chinese forces in the South China Sea (protecting American interests in Taiwan). This provides the U.S. with an effective deterrent to a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan without having to further escalate tensions by supplying Taiwan directly. It could simultaneously deter worrisome Chinese activity in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota harbor, which was built with Chinese funds and sometimes hosts Chinese warships. The U.S. can also supply India with air-launched anti-ship missiles and undersea drones to surveille Chinese naval activity. Cooperation and eventual rotational deployments between Indian, U.S., and Australian bases can reinforce this framework, strengthen existing alliances such as AUKUS, and build on existing ties such as the Quad. In the long term, this naval alliance can enhance trust between the U.S. and India, transforming bilateral relations from a mostly transactional relationship to a more enduring alliance.
On land, the Himalayas also present fertile grounds for military cooperation. As China grows more aggressive in its border dispute with India’s Ladakh region, America can supply India with surveillance equipment and cold weather gear to deter the encroachments of Chinese patrols. The U.S. should also continue counterintelligence sharing with Indian forces. The Obama administration’s Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) aimed to achieve some of these goals by building up India’s military tech sector, although these efforts were hampered by the reluctance of U.S. defense firms to part with their intellectual property and invest in India’s relatively small defense market. However, the Biden administration’s Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) successfully bypasses this issue by focusing on technologies not limited to defense, such as AI, semiconductors, high performance computing, and quantum technologies. While the DTTI was explicitly focused on defense, iCET is much broader and industry focused. In the education sector, initiatives such as STEM talent exchanges and partnerships between U.S. and Indian universities have emerged. Other pillars include a bilateral space partnership and plans to aid the Indian government in assessing the semiconductor industry and its role in global supply chains.
It would be a mistake, however, to narrow the scope of U.S.-Indian partnership to their mutual interest vis-a-vis China. America and India can also work together on a variety of issues ranging from trade (particularly pharmaceuticals, for which the U.S. depends heavily on India), to nuclear power, as well as diplomacy in Africa and the Pacific.
Trade is perhaps most vital. Historically, U.S. trade relations with India have been hampered by India’s skepticism of plurilateral trade agreements; India opted out of the trade portion of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and remains opposed to e-commerce negotiations at the WTO due to opposition to the WTO’s moratorium on duties for electronic transmissions. Currently, U.S.-India trade talks are being conducted through the Strategic Trade Dialogue (part of the aforementioned iCET), which primarily covers iCET related issues. Ordinary issues such as tariff reductions and economic policy unrelated to foreign affairs are discussed through the Trade Policy Forum. However, Trade Policy Forum talks have experienced limited success in part due to tariffs imposed by both sides during the Trump administration.
By ending this bifurcated division and seeking to improve trade ties in areas such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals (rather than only through iCET and defense-related industries), the U.S. can strengthen its relationship with India. India’s reluctance to engage in plurilateral agreements could be resolved by a separate, bilateral free trade treaty, like Australia’s Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) with India in 2022. The EU has begun talks for a similar agreement, which could also provide a blueprint for the United States. Despite India’s historic reticence, limited participation in plurilateral negotiations is also possible. India could increase its foreign investment by joining the WTO’s negotiations on Investment Facilitation for Development, aimed at improving the environment for investment in developing nations.
Fully implementing the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement represents another diplomatic step. Despite Congressional approval of the Agreement in 2008 and an additional agreement to build 6 U.S. designed nuclear reactors in India in 2016, no reactors have been delivered. The deal has already allowed India to expand its share of clean energy and sign uranium import agreements with a variety of countries, becoming the only nation outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain fuel for its reactors.
Completion of the deal can be aided by policy reforms in both countries. India must amend its Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), which departs from standards established in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. While the Convention requires that plant operators (rather than suppliers) assume responsibility for potential damages, the CLNDA still allows suppliers to face liability, resulting in many western companies expressing hesitation to supply India’s reactors (and causing India to rely instead on the Russian state company Rosatom). Likewise, the U.S. can speed up the deal’s implementation by allowing export licenses for technology used in India’s nuclear program, such as nanotechnology, commercial space launch components, and X-ray equipment.
Closer U.S.-India cooperation can also provide the U.S. with a diplomatic advantage throughout the global south. While many nations in these regions may not entirely trust the U.S., India commands a large share of goodwill. Earlier this year, Papua New Guinea’s prime minister James Marape extended a warm welcome to Narendra Modi, declaring the need for a “third big voice” on the world stage and pledging that the Pacific “will rally behind your leadership”. As Russia extends its influence in the global south by backing anti-western regimes in Africa, and China continues to expand its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India’s friendship will become vital for the U.S. to maintain its relationships among these nations.
A potential stumbling block in the U.S.-India relationship is America’s complex relationship with Pakistan, a longtime ally in the Cold War and more recently during the Afghanistan conflict. Ongoing tensions in Kashmir could disrupt American efforts to maintain good ties with both its South Asian allies. However, the expansion of BRI into Pakistan calls into question the nation’s geostrategic allegiance to the U.S. India presents the U.S. with a more stable regional partnership, and one without the baggage of the Pakistani military’s complicated role in the Afghan war (which often involved funding jihadists even while receiving support from the U.S. to fight them).
Increased strategic cooperation presents mutual military, diplomatic, and economic advantages to India and the U.S. As an aspiring great power, India will never have and does not desire the type of alliance that exists between the U.S. and treaty allies such as Japan or NATO countries. But to continue its climb towards becoming a great power, India requires American assistance, which is in the U.S. interest to provide. While American concerns regarding China may not be entirely the same as Indian concerns, the two overlap considerably. Through a simultaneous pursuit of a greater military and economic partnership, the U.S. and India can each achieve their strategic goals.
