Joshua Robinson
On 24th November 2022, a bundle of bills packaged as ‘anti-gay propaganda’ measures passed their third reading in the state Duma and were swiftly signed into law by President Vladimir Putin. This development represented a significant expansion – and hardening – of the vaguely-worded 2013 laws which have seen activists fined and imprisoned, and been linked to a sustained trebling in violent anti-LGBT crimes across the Russian Federation.
The scope is significantly farther-reaching than the infamous 2013 ‘anti-gay’ law. The caveat that limited restrictions to ‘distribution of propaganda to minors’ has been removed, effectively criminalising the expression of pro-LGBT sentiment. Public same-sex expression of any type – from lectures and concerts to hand-holding – fall under the remit of the restrictions if carried out in a space where others are present.
The consequences are personally and financially ruinous. Individuals can now be fined four times the 2013 legislation of up to 400,000 roubles (c. 5200 USD), equal to around a year’s average salary in Russia. Organisations can face a bankrupting 10 million rouble penalty (c. 132,000 USD), ten times higher than the mandate of the preceding legislation.
Repeat offenders and those who use “media” to “propagandise non-traditional relations” face jail-time of up to five years. This is an unprecedented development in Russia’s post-communist history which echoes the imprisonment of around 60,000 gay men in the Soviet Union under Stalinist anti-sodomy articles. Not only has the severity of the laws increased, but the authorities have indicated how seriously they are prepared use them: in 2022, there were more prosecutions and convictions for ‘propaganda’ than any year since 2013.
These laws underpin an evolving and increasingly state-led approach to sexual minorities with a political motive. Off the back of these laws, other repressive policies have been brought to life, advancing through a ban on Trans gender-reassignment surgery (June 2023), reports of conversion therapy at private clinics, and the designation of the ‘international LGBT movement’ as an ‘extremist organisation’ (November 2023).
Origins
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 pumped kerosene into parliament's determination and creativity when it came to repressive laws. Passing anti-LGBT laws with accompanying rhetoric had a well-established and successful precedent in Russia, and LGBT is viewed as a risk-free and politically salient scapegoat. As early as July 2022, Communist Party deputies had proposed curbing ‘childfree’ lifestyles and the promotion of “non-traditional sexual orientations.”
Targeting the LGBT community gels perfectly with the Kremlin’s narrative of Russia as a bastion of ‘traditional’ values, an ideological and political alternative to a decaying and decadent West. For parliamentarians seeking political clout and perhaps a career boost, formulating laws against “non-traditional sexual relations” goes down particularly well with the Presidential administration if framed within the context of Russia’s demographic crisis. The (mistaken) belief that clamping down on homosexuality will ameliorate cascading birth rates persists among many in Russia’s political class.
However, the timing and focus of the laws – which explicitly merge ‘non-traditional relations’, homosexuality, ‘propaganda’, gender-transition and paedophilia into a usefully adaptable hydra that seeks to destroy Russia’s morality and demographic stability – are a reaction to events in Ukraine. Passionate speeches decrying the corruption of children and demographic threat of same-sex relations were televised as a distraction from Ukraine’s recapture of Kherson city last autumn. The criminalisation of the ‘international LGBT movement’ comes at a time of stagnation across the front and, and many polls show a dip in active support for the ‘Special Military Operation’.
LGBT, therefore, makes an excellent scapegoat. The Kremlin can score almost guaranteed approval rating victories by tapping into the homophobic climate in society that it has helped to cultivate. A 2020 Levada poll revealed that 18% of Russia’s population said that they wanted LGBT people ‘eliminated’, down from 21% in 2015.
Impacts
‘Non-traditional relations’, in conjunction with November’s ban on the ‘international LGBT movement’, continues a trend of vague language used in Russia’s discriminatory legislation. This absence of clear definitions is a strategic device that allows Russia's authorities to apply the laws as they see fit and fosters a culture of fear among Russia’s queer citizens. Even before the law was signed, publishers scrambled to censor literature that referenced same-sex relationships. One video posted on the RUSSIA NEXT Telegram news channel shows a new copy of Max Falk’s ‘Shattered’ with references to same-sex relationships blocked out. Several publishers, such as Popcorn books, are now under investigation by the authorities for ‘propagandising’ same-sex relationships. The ‘cancel culture’ that propaganda professionals like Olga Skabayeva adore to admonish in bombastic talk shows has become most overt in post-war Russia itself.
Telegram remains a haven for queer activist, social and dating groups, as do a variety of international gay dating apps, though Russia has taken steps to makes these less accessible. Queer activist spaces such as St. Petersburg’s Действия still run their lectures underground, and some of those most public of queer spaces, gay bars, remain open – though, as I noted on a trip in February, the already slimmest of rainbow flags has been replaced with neutral branding.
It is still possible to have a life as an LGBT person in Russia, but that life is increasingly difficult. The rise in prosecutions for propaganda shows that the authorities are ready to pursue people for a crime that are not fully defined. The hounding of activists and police raids on queer clubs in Moscow and St. Petersburg – some of which have since been shuttered – reinforces the legislative message that ‘you are not welcome here.’ To live as a gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans, or queer person in the Russian Federation today means increasingly suppressing your identity and maintaining an increasingly high degree of self-censorship in public spaces, whether that be speech and dress, to public expression of affection. LGBT people will still form networks and social groups, but these will shift increasingly from private to secretive spaces as public – including digital – spaces are increasingly surveilled.
It is not the anti-propaganda laws on their own that are suppressing the lives of Russia’s queer citizens in such a devastating way. Rather, a new state approach to sexual minorities and the instrumentalisation of a cumulative buildup of discriminatory legislation, annihilation of trans rights, designation of a host of LGBTQ charities and support organisations as ‘Foreign Agents’, increasingly vehement rhetoric in and out of parliament, and a tolerance for anti-LGBT violence by those in positions of power is shaping Russia in a way that is putting the lives of queer citizens at risk. Those that have the means to leave have done so or are in the process: but most LGBTQ citizens do not have this option. The West has been reluctant to accept Russian applications for asylum in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, though this has shown tentative signs of changing in recent weeks in the wake of new laws against sexual minorities in the country.
If stagnation in the war continues, or should things take a turn for the worse for Russia’s armed forces, LGBT people may become scapegoated in more sinister ways. The Russian state has already indicated its willingness to use legislation to boost approval-ratings in the face of political difficulties. What is changing, however, is the implementation of legislation beyond exemplary cases and bombastic parliamentary speeches. Political homophobia is being translated into serious action not only against prominent activists and protesters, but non-activist LGBT citizens – including under-18s – and commercial establishments. The political homophobia of an increasingly militarised and war-ready Russia may well grow into something more centralised and systematic, should the Kremlin’s ‘Special Military Operation’ fail to secure victories it cannot sell at home.
