Ciara Rushton | News Contributor
The 2025 elections for the German national parliament, the Bundestag, took place on February 23. In the midst of a changing international environment, including the advent of a second Trump administration, the incoming government will have a variety of old and new foreign policy issues to address.Foremost among these are the ongoing war in Ukraine, relations with China, and how to manage the growing influence of the far-right.
In February 2022, days after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered what has come to be known as the Zeitenwende, literally a “times-turn,” speech. The speech described the invasion as marking the beginning of a new era in world politics. It also committed Germany to a drastic change in its defence policy, pledging €100 billion to rearm the Bundeswehr, the German armed forces. These shifts in the European security sphere forced Germany to reevaluate its longtime hesitance towards rearmament and defence spending.
On 23 February 2025, elections to the Bundestag were held seven months earlier than planned, after the coalition of Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) collapsed in November. The SPD suffered significant losses in the Bundestag elections largely due to Germany’s poor economic performance. It is anticipated that they will take the junior role in another grand coalition with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which won the most parliamentary seats in the election, and Germany will soon have a new conservative Chancellor at its helm. Alongside this, the country is likely to see a redirection of its foreign policy as a result of these elections.
Friedrich Merz, CDU leader and longtime rival of former Chancellor Angela Merkel, will almost certainly lead the incoming government. Almost immediately after his election win, he declared the need for European countries to increase defence budgets and warned that increasing American isolationism means it is “five minutes to midnight” for Europe. Whilst this echoed the outgoing administration’s call for increased German self-reliance regarding defence, Merz has taken this perspective further to address the challenges posed by the Trump administration. The concept of European strategic autonomy is not new. Championed byFrench President Emmanuel Macron, the concept has pervaded policy discussions in Europe. However, the situation, Merz argues, has become increasingly dire. He compared the support of US Vice President JD Vance and Elon Musk for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) to Russian election interference, and criticised Trump’s seeming “indifference” to the fate of Europe. His “absolute priority” for government foreign and defence policy will be the achievement of “independence from the US.”
Merz’s comments hold deep significance for the CDU, which has been split since the 1950s between Gaullists and Atlanticists. The former group advocated for policies similar to that of French President Charles de Gaulle, who emphasised the need for greater political and military independence from other states. By contrast, the Atlanticists, who were long dominant within the party due to the doctrine of founder Konrad Adenauer, advocated for greater integration with the West, particularly with the United States. Alexander Clarkson, lecturer in German and European Studies at King’s College London, argues that the comments of Merz, who was previously described as “the most pro-US politician in Germany” and a staunch Atlanticist, reflect the dramatic impact of Trump’s European policy on the bloc’s internal politics. The US-European relationship will likely change drastically in the coming years, with Germany playing a lead role in shaping this.
Merz’s election will also impact the conflict in Ukraine. Support for Ukraine is high in Germany and will likely increase in the incoming government. Outgoing Chancellor Scholz opposed providing long-range missiles to Ukraine even after the White House approved long-range strikes inside Russia. By contrast, in December 2024 Merz promised to provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles if he won the election. Given that the future of US support for Ukraine is uncertain, with Trump publicly calling Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy a “dictator” and berating him in a public meeting in the Oval Office, Germany and its European allies will likely play an enhanced role in the conflict.
Merz is also expected to make some changes to German foreign policy outside of Europe. He has stated that he will not abide by International Criminal Court arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, calling it “absurd” to bar the Israeli leader from visiting Germany. This marks a shift from the Scholz administration’s avoidance of the issue. More uncertain, however, is where Merz’s administration will stand on relations with China. In 2024, the United States overtook China as Germany’s largest trading partner for the first time since 2015. The Scholz government often took a more pro-China stance to prioritise business interests, including voting against European Union tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Whilst it is widely expected that Merz will take a more “hawkish” stance against China, the increasingly isolationist foreign policy of the US may reduce his options other than strengthening relations with China.
Whilst the future of Germany’s foreign and defence policies dominates news headlines, it is difficult to ignore the significance of the AfD’s success in the parliamentary elections. The far-right political party emerged in April 2013, first securing representation in the Bundestag in 2017 as the third-largest party. Though the other major parties have long agreed upon a “firewall” to avoid collaboration with the far-right, the AfD now possesses the second-largest total number of parliamentary seats after the CDU and will therefore be more difficult to freeze out. Isolationist, pro-Russian, and supported by prominent figures in the Trump administration including the vice president, they will oppose much of what Merz hopes to achieve in foreign policy in the coming years. The CDU-SPD coalition will face fierce difficulties in managing the country and German foreign relations with the AfD as the largest opposition party.
Sophia Besch and Saskia Brechenmacher, experts at Carnegie Endowment, have argued that Merz will not only be taking on responsibility for Germany, but also for the “survival of the European project”. After decades of hesitancy surrounding overseas involvement, American policy changes and the ongoing war in Ukraine have forced the country into action. Carsten Linneman, general secretary of the CDU, argued during the election campaign that “Germany must once again assume a leading role in Europe.” The incoming Chancellor will have to do just that.
